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N OBODY WILL SAY it was a quiet term. The total number of cases decided was again small, only eighty-nine all told. There was the usual quota of trivia, and maybe a little over; more piddling 
points on statutes of limitations, for example, than posterity is ever going 
to want to know about. 
But there was enough serious national business to make the term 
memorable. Every region felt the effects; Hollywood won a slight reprieve 
from censorship, while school children and their teachers in New York got 
no reprieve at all from school time religious training and loyalty purges, 
respectively. Illinoisans were warned to hold their tongues if they would 
disparage groups, Oregon discovered that maltreatment by its medical 
organizations of experiments in group medicine occurred too long ago to 
count, and the South postponed for a year any consideration of its basic 
problem of school segregation. In more international perspective, a J ap-
anese-American traitor and military courts in Germany were subjects of 
decisions, and aliens within the United States had a murderously bad time 
with a series of cases reflecting a renewed chauvinism in legislative policy. 
Finally there was the steel case. 
The general tone of the term will be suggested by these figures. More 
than a quarter of the cases involved civil rights. In twenty civil rights 
*This article is the sixth in an annual series. The purposes of the series are (a) to present a 
concise summary of the most interesting of the cases; (b) to comment briefly on their apparent 
general social significance; and (c) to make some record of factors observed concerning the 
institutional functioning of the Court. Shot through each purpose is that sense of personal relief 
which an author gets from expressing his own views as to the proper decisions of the cases. 
The preceding articles, covering the 1946 through 1950 Terms, are at 15, 16, 17, 18 Univ. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1 (1947-50), and 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 165 (1951). 
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. 
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cases, the Court divided. In fifteen of the twenty, it decided against the 
claimed right. 
I. HIGH SPOTS OF THE YEAR 
Dramatic high spot of the year was Y ozmgstown Sheet & Tttbe Co. v. 
Sawyer~ in which the Court and the Constitution were precipitated square-
ly into the middle of the row between the President and Congress over la-
bor policy. A nationwide steel strike was the most immediate consequence 
of the decision, and although for a few days it looked as though settlement 
might come easily, that hope soon disappeared and a steel shortage began 
to bite into defense production. In the long run the resolution of "the 
constitutional question," as it was described in the press, was a marked 
step toward restoring the balance of power between the Congress and the 
President, a balance which was tipping ever more toward the latter. 
Whether Congress would have the wit to make use of its renewed lease on 
power was an issue by no means resolved at Term's end. 
The law, in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,2 finally recognized that movies were 
out of the nickelodeon stage by extending them some constitutional pro-
tection from censorship or, at least, from capricious censorship. Other 
major civil rights cases were Zorach v. Claus01t,3 which modified markedly 
the Court's previous decision on release time and gives constitutional 
validity to the New York system of encouraging religious training; Adler 
v. Board of Education, 4 upholding New York's Feinberg Law, aimed at in-
sulating the teaching profession from disloyal associations; and Beau-
harnais v. Illinois,5 upholding conviction of a man who circulated a peti-
tion for racial zoning to the Chicago City Council because the petition as-
serted that Negroes were rapists, marihuana users, and knife carriers. The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, incidental-
ly, stood on principle and opposed the validity of the state statute in-
volved.6 
Legislatively, in 1951-52, the United States continued to treat most 
lavishly the alien who stayed in his home country (six plus billion dollars 
for mutual assistance) and most severely the alien seeking refuge on our 
own side of the Statue of Liberty (a new McCarran Act). Judicially, the 
Court threw its own set of harpoons into the alien who has come within 
our midst. One case in the spirit of most unparalleled severity was Hari-
1 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). 
! 343 u.s. 495 (1952). 4 342 u.s. 485 (1952). 
3 343 u.s. 306 (1952). 6 343 u.s. 250 (1952). 
6 While the NAACP was not a direct party, its General Counsel, Mr. Thurgood Marshall, 
signed the petition for rehearing. 
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siades v. Shateghnessy, 7 which in its extremest instance sanctioned the 
deportation of an Italian who had been a Communist for a short time as 
a young man, but who had been quite disassociated from such activities 
for more than twenty years, and whose association had terminated more 
than ten years before Congress made such association a deportable of-
fense. Even more extreme was Carlson v. Landon, 8 a decision permitting 
the Immigration Service to put suspected aliens in jail and hold them 
without bail, apparently indefinitely. This is the closest equivalent to a 
lettre de cachet in American history since the Civil War. 
II. REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND LABOR 
Labor 
There was one major labor relations problem at the 1951 Term. That 
was the Youngstown Steel seizure case.9 
In December, 1951, it became apparent that the steel industry was 
headed for labor trouble.10 There had been no contract adjustment for two 
years, and the labor contracts were about to expire. Collective bargaining 
was unsuccessful, and a strike, potentially disastrous to military output 
for the Korean war, for the mutual assistance program, for the national 
defense and for domestic consumption, was clearly impending. 
In light of a singularly unco-ordinated Congressional labor policy, 
President Truman, if he was to act at all, had two basic choices. He could 
proceed under the Taft-Hartley Act provision dealing with national emer-
gency strikes,I1 causing a panel to investigate the situation and report to 
him and getting an eighty day federal court injunction while the country 
and the parties mulled over the report. Sometime in the latter part of the 
eighty day period he could, for the umpteenth time in his two terms, ask 
7 342 u.s. 580 (1952). 
8 342 u.s. 524 (1952). 
D 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). The discussion following is a deviation from the usual pattern of this 
article in that it expands at some length on the steel case. This course is followed in part 
because of the interest and importance of the subject, and in part because there were no other 
cases of major economic significance this year. The other labor cases were NLRB v. American 
Nat'l Ins. Co., 72 S. Ct. 824 (1952), a decision which may have vast repercussions to collective 
bargaining since it appears to permit employers to eli:clude from discussion so-called "manage-
ment function clauses," and Int'l Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 
(1952), holding that actions for damages for jurisdictional strikes may be brought under the 
Taft-Hartley Act without prior reference to the Labor Board. 
10 The author was among counsel to the government in the Montgomery Ward seizure 
litigation in World War IT, and in the discussion following has drawn with freedom on the 
brief in that case. He has also drawn at will from his The Future of Presidential Seizure, 46 
Fortune, No. 1, at 70 Guly, 1952). 
u 61 Stat. 152 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-80 (Supp., 1951). 
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the Congress to do something about emergency strikes, and beyond that, 
he was utterly powerless. 
The second alternative was to proceed under the Defense Production 
Act through the Wage Stabilization Board/2 a tripartite body which 
might be able to handle the situation through hearings and an award, al-
though the award would have to be accepted voluntarily by the parties. 
The President chose this course; the Board recommended a wage increase, 
and the only serious remaining issue appeared to be how much of a com-
pensating price increase the government would allow the industry. At that 
point, Defense Production Administrator Wilson kicked over the traces 
and publicly disapproved the wage recommendation. This led to Mr. Wil-
son's retirement from his government position, but the break in adminis-
tration ranks proved fatal as the industry, following Wilson's lead, firmly 
resisted the concessions to the union. 
As it became apparent that the industry would not accept the Board's 
recommendations, a strike again became imminent. And again the Presi-
dent's basic alternatives were two: he could now invoke the Taft-Hartley 
Act and win an additional eighty days delay or, so he thought, he could 
seize the steel properties, take them into the possession of the government, 
and put the Stabilization Board's orders into effect himselfP 
The first alternative seemed to him appallingly unfair. A new investi-
gating panel could only chew over the identical evidence which had just 
been before the Board, and the Board's proceedings had already delayed 
the strike for ninety-nine days and thus frustrated what had been found 
to be the union's just demands for that long. Moreover, one may suspect, 
the President had very little sympathy in the Spring of 1952 for using a 
statute which had the name "Taft" in it. 
The President thereupon chose the seizure device. An appropriate order 
was issued, a few flags were run up, and by operation of a remarkable legal 
fiction, Secretary of Commerce Sawyer was for the moment czar of the 
nation's steel industry. 
The industry rushed to court, and the lawsuit proceeded in a welter of 
hyperbole on both sides. While the government contended for an unlimit-
ed conception of Presidential power and the Solicitor General announced 
H 64 Stat. 803 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2101-23 (1951). 
1a The discussion above omits two lesser alternatives. The requisition provision of the De-
fense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 2081 (1951), was unavailable 
in part for the practical reason that the President did not have in his official pocket the enor-
mous down-payment required to be made under the statute, and in part because that kind of 
payment-in-advance system is singularly inappropriate for a very short term, but indefinite, 
taking. The second is the Selective Service Act of 1948, discussed in note 38 infra. 
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to an astonished Court of Appeals that an adverse decision would "repeal" 
the Emancipation Proclamation and re-establish slavery, the industry 
proclaimed that a decision against it would "repeal" Magna Carta. The 
trial court gave a preliminary injunction against the government; the 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia granted a stay; and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari immediately. The case was argued a 
week after it came to the Court and was decided ill June-three weeks 
later. 
The issues, though somewhat narrower than whether the principles of 
the great Charters of the Anglo-Saxons or of the black race should be un-
done, were broad enough. Not involved was the question of whether Con-
gress had the power to authorize the seizure of basic industrial properties 
to terminate labor disputes; everyone agreed that Congress could do this 
as part of its eminent domain power. The question was whether, in the 
absence of authorizing Congressional action, (a) the statutes on the books 
should be read as by their own force precluding Presidential action, and if 
not, (b) whether the President had an eminent domain power of his own 
which could be invoked for such an emergency as that then confronting 
the United States. Appraisal of the Court's answer required consideration 
of the background of executive seizure powers and of the nature of plant 
seizure. 
(a) Executive power. While the law books commonly announce that the 
eminent domain power is purely legislative in origin, there have been im-
portant exceptions, for there are executive powers which antedate the 
parliamentary system. As long ago as the reign of Elizabeth, persons had 
been licensed by the crown to go upon private property to take saltpetre, 
and the matter became a subject of litigation before Lord Coke.14 Salt-
petre was used in the manufacture of a newfangled product called gun 
powder, "devised within time of memory," said the Court, but already so 
valuable as to be essential to "the necessary defence of the realm." The 
Court approved the taking because "the ministers of the King ought to 
make provision of saltpetre which will endure a long time, and when need 
is, to make it into gunpowder, which may be made before the navy can 
to put in readiness." 
The saltpetre case is so palpably not the steel case that it would be ir-
relevant but for one thing: it drew the original line, which has lasted with 
much deviation since, of emergency as the boundary of the executive taking 
power. Lord Coke's court specifically declared that if, instead of saltpetre, 
the King desired gravel for the repair of one of his palaces, he could not 
u The Saltpetre Case, 12 Co. Rep. 12, 13 (1607). 
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take it; saltpetre was different because its use "extends to the defense of 
the whole realm, in which every subject has benefit." 
What developed between the middle of the sixteenth and the middle of 
the nineteenth century was a theory of emergency executive taking pow-
ers which had its ultimate complication in a matter far remote from emi-
nent domain, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the one hand, there 
were obviously occasions when property "must" be taken. Property in the 
path of a fire might be destroyed to stop the fire, and property about to 
fall into enemy hands might be destroyed so that it would do the enemy 
no good.15 On the other hand, it is usually unfair to make the individual 
bear the whole cost of the common good, and under the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity there was no way of requiring the community to pay for 
what the executive might do. 
The result was an emergence, before 1850, by practice and by judicial 
decision, of a noncompensable executive taking power for immediate emer-
gencies, principally of war and of fire. During the Revolution and the War 
of 1812, property was repeatedly "impressed" when needed for immediate 
military purposes. During the Revolution, Rhode Island College was tak-
en over for a hospital, and in 1812 General Jackson took what he needed 
for his army at New Orleans.16 In 1813 the House Committee on Military 
Affairs, backing up a General who had seized several boats, said, "In the 
circumstances of war, such exigencies will frequently occur in which the 
commanding officer will stand justified in taking, by force, such neces-
saries, either for support or conveyance, as are absolutely indispensable 
and which cannot be obtained by any other means.m7 
Those early episodes were never considered by the Supreme Court. The 
first case before those Justices arose out of the Mexican War when a 
trader named Harmony took a large wagon train from peaceful Inde-
pendence, Missouri, to the very edg~ of danger at El Paso, Texas. He 
quickly discovered that he had come too close to the front. 
Also at El Paso was an American force of 1,000 men, under Colonel 
Doniphan, planning to attack Chihuahua, 300 miles away. But Doni-
phan's foree was too small for comfort, and he feared a surprise attack as 
he marched. Suddenly inspiration came .. Lt. Colonel Mitchell, of Doni-
phan's staff, seized all the wagons in the vicinity, including Harmony's, 
15 Leading cases are Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. (U.S.) 357 (1788) (war destruction); 
MayorofNewYorkv.Lord, 18Wend. (N.Y.) 126 (1837) (fire). 
16 American State Papers (Class IX, Claims) No. 86, p. 197 (1797); No. 584, p; 833 (1822); 
No. 590, p. 838 (1822); and numerous others in the same series. 
17 Ibid., No. 461, p. 649 (1818). 
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and pressed all the teamsters into service. Doniphan's force took the 
wagons with them to Chihuahua, forming them into corrals at night for the 
protection of the soldiers as they slept. Eventually the wagons fell into the 
hands of the enemy. 
When Harmony got back to safety, he sued Mitchell for the value of 
his wagons, asserting that the military had no right to take his property 
even in the emergency at El Paso. Therefore, said Harmony, the taking 
was a personal theft by Mitchell for which he should have to pay Har-
mony. The trial court gave judgment for Harmony for $90,000, which 
Colonel Mitchell, whose compensation was $187.00 a month, would have 
found hard to pay. 
Congress promptly passed an Act committing the government to pay 
any judgment which the Supreme Court might sustain against Mitchell 
and directing the Attorney General to defend the Colonel. The Attorney 
General argued that the emergency justified the seizure. 
Nonetheless the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the trader 
Harmony. Chief Justice Taney admitted that there were occasions when 
"a military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress private 
property into the public service or take it for public use." But what were 
those occasions? Said Taney: 
The danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public 
service, such as will not admit to delay, and where the action of the civil authority would 
be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls for. It is impossible to define 
the particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this power may be lawfully 
exercised. Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is the emergency that 
gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be 
justified.18 
Mitchell 'il. Harmony makes verbal sense in its statement of the doctrine 
of emergency. It makes practical sense in that the United States got the 
wagons, and paid for them by assuming Mitchell's debt, which is fair 
enough. It makes no sense at all as an application of its doctrine to its 
facts, since it puts the test of "emergency" and then holds that Colonel 
Doniphan's situation was not an emergency. Since a more extreme life and 
death military emergency would be hard to imagine, one must assume 
that the Court made sound law and then twisted its facts because this 
was the only way it could reach the just result of letting the United 
States foot the bill. 
With the establishment of the Court of Claims a few years later, and 
the partial waiver of sovereign immunity, the necessity for this disjunction 
18 Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. (U.S.) 115, 133-'34 (1852). 
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of law and fact passed. From the Civil War to the Twentieth Century, he 
verbal test of executive emergency power remained what it was in Mitchell 
v. Harmony, but the factual standard perceptibly dropped. A line began 
to develop between "extreme emergency" takings which, harking back to 
the early fire destruction cases, were noncompensable; and the "minor 
emergency" takings, which were considerably less pressing and which 
were compensable. Destruction of a toll bridge in the course of the Civil 
War by the armed forces, to keep it out of enemy hands, was (a) legal and 
(b) noncompensable.19 The taking of river steamers on the Mississippi, 
far from the field of battle, for troop movements was (a) legal and 
(b) compensable.20 The farthest reach of the doctrine that almost any 
executive wartime taking was legal, so long as it was paid for, was a Span-
ish-American War Court of Claims decision, Alexander v. United States.21 
There the taking of a farm in Pennsylvania for military training purposes 
was upheld although the actual hostilities were over and, in any case, had 
never been any closer than Cuba. 
Meanwhile, as law was developing through decisions, it was also devel-
oping through executive practice and Congressional acquiescence. All the 
takings mentioned so far were by military subordinates. President Lincoln 
himself directed the taking of the railroad and telegraph lines between 
Annapolis and Washington.22 Senator Ben Wade of Ohio, a leader of the 
Republican party, said the Government "may seize upon private property 
anywhere, and subject it to the public use by virtue of the Constitution."23 
Senator Cowan said that when Congress declares war, it gives the Presi-
dent "all the powers necessary to attain the desired end; and among 
other things it confers on him power, as has been well said, to impress 
horses, railroads, telegraph lines, men, teams, everything of that kind into 
his service, and compel them to work according to his plan and pattern."24 
It gives a false sense of precision to summarize this mass of essentially 
unco-ordinated practice and decision; but, with due allowance for the 
haziness of the sources, it seems to have been generally accepted at the 
turn of the twentieth century that there was an executive power, at least 
in times of declared war, to take property in case of emergency, so long as 
19 United States v. Pacific Ry. Co., 120 U.S. 227 (1887). 
20 United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 623 (1871). 
21 39 Ct. Cl. 383 (1904). 
22 2 War of the Rebellion Official Records 603-4 (Series I, 1880). 
23 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 2d Sess. 509 (1862). 
u Ibid., at 516. For similar statements see Fessenden, ibid., at 512, Browning, ibid., at 
510, 520, and Grimes, ibid., at 520. 
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it was paid for and, in even more extreme emergencies, without paying 
for it. 
This nonstatutory taking power should be regarded as part of the Presi-
dent's war power. His power in peacetime is something else again. Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt gave serious thought to seizing the coal mines to 
prevent a coal shortage during the strike of 1902, and probably would have 
done so if the strike had not been settled.25 In 1914 the American Federa-
tion of Labor asked President Wilson to take over the coal mines of Colo-
rado during a strike.26 In 1922, President Harding gave serious considera-
tion to taking such action during a coal strike.27 But the taking power was 
not used in any of these instances, and so its exercise in peacetime has 
never been tested. 
Nor was it tested in World War I. In that War many properties were 
taken, but the statutes passed by Congress were broad enough to make 
unnecessary the taking of property by the President on his own. There 
were those who were confident that he had the power if he needed it. War-
ren G. Harding, then a Senator, said, "[I]f there were a real war emergen-
cy, if there were a present necessity for the seizure of the lines of commu-
nication in this country, the Chief Executive would take them over, else 
he would be unfaithful to his duties as such C.hief Executive .... [I]f the 
President believes that there is such an emergency, he ought to seize 
them."28 
The real beginnings of large scale takings came with World War II.29 
These were of three types. First were the pre-Pearl Harbor takings by 
President Roosevelt for the purpose of settling industrial disputes which 
interfered with aid to England and the tooling up for the War. Second 
were the seizures between Pearl Harbor and the adoption of the War La-
bor Disputes Act of 1943, which explicitly gave a statutory base for sei-
zures. Third were the seizures under that Act. 
The seizures of the third class are obviously distinguishable from the 
steel case because of their statutory base. The seizures of the second class 
are distinguishable, if at all, only by the substantial difference that they 
occurred in the midst of war which was (a) total and (b) declared. There 
were five seizures of this class. The three seizures of the first class (pre-
25 20 Works of Theodore Roosevelt 466 (1926). 
26 Woodrow Wilson Papers, File VI, Box 393, Nos. 901, 902 (Mss. Div., Lib. Cong.). 
27 74 Literary Digest 8-10 Uuly 29, 1922). 
2s 56 Cong. Rec. 906! (1918). 
~~For details, see Appendix No. 2 to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the instant case, 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 900 (1952). 
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Pearl Harbor) are not, on any substantial basis, distinguishable at all from 
the steel case; for just as the steel seizure came during the period of tool-
ing up for conceivable war with Russia, so the 1941 seizure came during 
the period of tooling up for World War II.30 If there is any distinction be-
tween the two periods, the emergency of 1952 may be more severe than 
that of 1941, since in 1952 the United States was already directly engaged 
in shooting it out with the enemy. 
(b) The nature of seizure.31 Seizure, as it has been used, has simultane-
ously the form of an exertion of the eminent domain power, and the sub-
stance of regulation. Theoretically, the government is acquiring property, 
as if for a public building; actually it is enforcing a clumsy system of com-
pulsory arbitration. When a plant is seized, not much happens. A few 
flags may be run up, a few notices posted declaring that the property has 
been taken by the United States. In the steel case, the President signed 
Executive Order No. 10340, and Secretary Sawyer, seizing the property, 
told a few steel men that they should continue on the job as government 
managers. 
Typically in seizure cases, the government once in possession quiets the 
particular labor trouble which brought it in and otherwise leaves company 
administration alone. If the seizure is caused by the employer's refusal to 
accept a government wage recommendation, the government usually puts 
the recommendation into effect by its own order as "new owner," and 
does nothing else. It seemed about to do just this in the steel case but for 
restraining court orders. If the government is supporting the employer in 
a particular case, as against union demands, it either does nothing at all 
or gets an injunction to break a "strike against the government." The 
John L. Lewis case, with its $750,000 fine against the union, shows that 
seizure is an effective strike-stopping device. 
In the general sense of its bearing on the struggles of capital and labor, 
seizure is neutral. It is a device for carrying out government "recommen-
dations," and it gets its pro-management or pro-labor flavor only insofar 
as the underlying order is pro-management or pro-labor. Management, 
labor, and politicians commonly take stands on seizure-in-general instead 
ao A reader will share the sense of pain Justice Jackson must have felt when he attempted 
to wriggle out of the fact that the first pre-World War II seizures, that at North American 
Aviation, was on his opinion as Attorney General. See his opinion, ibid., at 877 n. 17. It would 
have been better if he had stopped with his forthright, "I should not bind present judicial 
judgment by earlier partisan advocacy." Ibid. -
31 Two admirable articles on seizure are Johnson, Administrative Problems of Government 
Seizure in Labor Disputes, 11 Pub. Admin. Rev. 189 {1951), and Willcox and Landis, Govern-
ment Seizure in Labor Disputes, 34 Cornell L.Q. 155 (1948). Many of the facts in the section 
following come from them. 
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of recognizing that what they are really for or against is the underlying 
order in the particular case. In the recent case, one may suspect that 
labor-sympathizing Senators Morse and Humphrey and Inland Steel's 
Randall took their stands respectively for and against the President's 
power on the constitutional question because they were, respectively, for 
and against the administration's wage-price proposals for steel. In World 
War I, the conservative Harding, then a Senator, was willing to under-
write a seizure power, probably because within the immediate range of his 
vision it would be used for anti-labor purposes. After President Roose-
velt's pre-Pearl Harbor seizure of North American Aviation, extremely 
conservative Dirksen of Illinois approved because the particular seizure 
operated to hamper Communists in a labor organization. 32 
Of the fifty World War II seizures, about half were m:ed to compel em-
ployer compliance and about half to compel employee compliance with 
War Labor Board orders. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in the 
steel case, put it this way: 
Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage increase and to keep 
the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President might use the same 
power to prevent a wage increase, to curb trade unionists, to regiment labor as op-
pressively as industry thinks it has been regimented by this seizure.33 
In one of the paradoxes of democratic government, the main strength of 
seizure as a device for settling labor disputes is its very cumbersomeness, 
its legal mysto-magic, its :flummery. Simplicity is not always a prime vir-
tue in a democracy. In terms of the immediate objective of settling a labor 
dispute, seizure is certainly a roundabout way of getting to its ends. If 
simplicity were the only value, a far simpler device in a dispute over 
wages would be an administrative hearing followed by an enforceable 
order deciding what wages were to be. 
Seizure required some form or pretense of an actual taking, a structure 
of government control, and endless accounting for all the incidents of the 
period of government "management." 
Because seizure is basically a masquerade, a pretense of government 
control, it may even require costumes and fancy titles. In one of the rail-
road seizures, the railroad managers were put into uniform, turned into 
colonels, and eventually became entitled to retired officers pay because 
they continued to do the identical jobs they had done before. 
The hocus-pocus helps give seizure the value which has made it the 
most useful device yet worked out for settling labor disputes in emergen-
32 87 Cong. Rec. 5974 (1943). 
33 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 888 (1952). 
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des. Its very fanciness, its unusual associations, make it look like less of a 
menace to free collective bargaining in peacetime. And if the terms of the 
seizure are not so pleasant for either side that it becomes willing to put up 
with seizure indefinitely, seizure will stimulate collective bargaining. 
(c) The decisi01~. The Court invalidated the taking, 6 to 3, with seven 
different opinions covering 133 pages. All that was absolutely clear as a 
result was that this particular seizure was invalid. 
The "opinion of the Court," delivered by Justice Black, was concurred 
in by Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, and Burton. Justice Clark, 
voting to invalidate, did so on separate grounds. Each of the Justices who 
joined Black's opinion also filed a separate opinion, and on separate 
grounds; and it is obvious from the diversity of their views that the Black 
opinion is at least a diplomatic triumph. As Justice Jackson said from the 
Bench, as a preface to his own opinion, "Justice Black's opinion is the 
least common denominator on which :five of us can agree." 
The "least common denominator" is pointedly and necessarily concise, 
leaving many questions unanswered. The discussion of the constitutional 
question is in six paragraphs, less than three pages. 34 The power of the 
Commander-in-Chief is not adequate "to take possession of private prop-
erty in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production." The execu-
tive powers apart from those of Commander-in-Chief do not extend to law-
making: "The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the law-
making process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the veto-
ing of laws he thinks bad." Other Presidents may have taken possession 
of private property to settle labor disputes; but Congress has not lost its 
"exclusive" powers thereby. 
From this opinion, by itself, one might conclude that the President is 
without power, even in time of total war, to take property without statu-
tory authority as a means of settling labor disputes. That view is con-
firmed by the concurrence of Justice Douglas, who found that the sanc-
tions for settling labor disputes were for Congress to determine. He put the 
legal dilemma: Seizure is a taking, an exertion of the eminent domain pow-
er; all takings require, under the Fifth Amendment, payment of just com-
pensation, and the steel companies are entitled to theirs. Where will the 
money come from? Only from Congress: "The branch of government that 
has the power to pay compensation for a seizure is the only one able to 
authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the President had effected."35 
at Ibid., at 866. 
35 Ibid., at 887. For discussion of the compensation aspects of plant seizures, see United 
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951), and 1951 Term article at 167-70. 
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But the other opinions are not so conclusive: 
1. Justice Frankfurter36 excluded from consideration the powers of the 
President in the absence of statute, and "the powers that flow from de-
clared war." Since he read the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act 
as one in which "Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power 
from the President as though it had said so in so many words," nothing 
in his opinion bears on the powers of the President after the expiration of 
the Taft-Hartley eighty day period, assuming that Congress did nothing 
further during the period by way of settling the strike on its own. 
2. Justice Burton's opinion37 rests squarely on Taft-Hartley; he spoke 
of "the clarity of the congressional reservation of seizure for its own con-
sideration." But his list of issues not decided reads like so many negative 
pregnants: This is not the case "in which Congress takes no action and out-
lines no governmental policy." This is not the case of "imminent invasion 
or threatened attack." This is not a claimed exercise of the powers of 
Commander-in-Chief of a nation "waging, or imminently threatened 
with, total war." 
3. Justice Clark, concurring only in the judgment of the Court, also had 
his reservations. He fully accepted the theory of Presidential emergency 
power, a power which "depends upon the gravity of the situation con-
fronting the nation." He apparently thought the Korean and Cold War 
situation quite grave enough, except for the fact that "Congress had pre-
scribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency 
at hand." The weight he gave to the Taft-Hartley Act is not clear since 
he rested primarily on the failure to exhaust a seizure provision of the 
Selective Service Act of 1948, a statute which had seemed virtually ir-
relevant to his eight brethren.38 
aa Ibid., at 867 et seq. 
37 Ibid., at 880 et seq. 
38 Ibid., at 882. The applicable provision of the Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 625 (1948), 
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 468 (1951), discussed by Justice Clark are subsections (a), (b) and (c). 
Those sections give to the President the power to seize industrial facilities which "fail" to 
produce materials on compulsory orders, which the President is authorized to make. Justice 
Clark's theory is that the President should have placed compulsory orders with strike-bound 
plants, and then seized. However the provision applies only to procurement "e."CClusively for 
the use of the armed forces of the United States, or for the use of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission." (Emphasis added.) A very small fraction of steel is used exclusively for this purpose. 
Most defense steel comes into government hands indirectly, through private processors. Yet 
the President is allowed to seize and operate only "for the production of such articles or ma-
terials as may be required by the Government." 
This section is not open to the interpretation that the government may also place com-
pulsory orders with steel producers for the benefit of other defense producers and then seize 
in case of a strike, because another subdivision of the same general section deals with the very 
subject of steel supplies for defense contractors. Subdivision (h) of this very section deals with 
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4. Of the majority opinions, that of Justice Jackson remains.39 Because 
this opinion assumes the most serious point in issue in a sentence, its twen-
ty pages are almost tangential to the discussion in which the rest of the 
Court was engaged; and yet its common sense does permeate the under-
lying issues of policy. 
Justice Jackson approached the problem by dividing Presidential pow-
ers into three areas. First is the area in which the President acts in co-
ordination with Congress, by executing its acts. That case, ex hypothesi, is 
not this case, since Congress had not authorized seizure. Second is the area 
of Presidential powers concurrent with those of Congress, which is to say 
that the President may act until Congress precludes his further action. 
Third is the area of exclusive Presidential power, in which Congress is in-
capable of limiting him. 
In this view, the issue necessarily must become whether seizure is in the 
second category, i.e., whether Congress has precluded Presidential action. 
The case is concededly not in category one, and (apart from Justice Jack-
son's opinion) no lawyer has yet been heard seriously to suggest that it 
belongs in category three. It was conceded by the government and by the 
dissent, and indeed can scarcely be rationally doubted, that if Congress 
had precluded seizure as a remedy, the President might not seize. 
Justice Jackson thus made his case absurdly easy for himself by taking 
the case out of the second category with little more than the simple asser-
tion that "It seems clearly eliminated." Listing the relevant statutes, he 
disposed of the point with the observation that the President had chosen 
"a different and inconsistent way of his own." Once the word "inconsist-
ent" is used, the case is over; but the Justice nonetheless proceeds to 
analyze for the remainder of his opinion the point nobody argued, namely 
whether the President may :fly into the teeth of Congressional will. The 
answer, not unexpectedly, is No. 
But though his choice of questions to be answered may be odd, the Jus-
tice's underlying premise is clear. He obviously believes that in this Re-
steel explicitly and exclusively and provides for orders for the benefit of contractors who in 
tum have "orders for steel products or steel materials required by the armed forces." The 
clause was added in Conference, at the insistence of the House Conferees, who reported to the 
House that without it there would be nothing in the bill "empowering the President to require 
producers of steel to make available to manufacturers having orders for steel products" the 
necessary steel. This subdivision also permits seizure, but only on one condition: that the pro-
ducers refuse to allocate such steel as they do produce in accordance with government orders. 
H they produce nothing, because of a strike, there is nothing to allocate, and hence the section 
has no application at all in the instant case. See H.R. Rep. No. 2438, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 50 
(1948). 
~9 72 s. Ct. 863, 869 (1952). 
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public the President has power enough without adding any more. "[A]l-
most alone, he fills the public eye and ear ... he exerts a leverage upon 
those who are supposed to check and balance his power which often can-
cels their effectiveness." The country will not suffer "if the Court refuses 
further to aggrandize the Presidential office, already so potent and so rela-
tively immune from judicial review, at the expense of Congress."40 
5. The dissent of the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, 
is twice the length of the text of the longest of the other opinions, and ap-
proaches its objective on a grand scale. 41 As a matter of strategy, the opin-
ion might have analyzed the constitutional issue in terms of the simple 
question of whether the Executive does or does not have one particular 
power, that of eminent domain. The opinion starts from this point, but 
expands prodigiously. It tells the story of the Korean struggle in its full 
economic and legislative setting, and paints a picture-in-implication of a 
beleaguered President struggling through the darkness, with a Congress 
refusing to provide the necessary ·light. The Taft-Hartley Act is high-
lighted as part of a hash of confused labor legislation which, at most, does 
not prohibit seizure. 
The Chief Justice lays about with a heavy hand, thwacking by quota-
tion of allegedly inconsistent prior positions Justices Jackson and Clark 
and steel counsel John W. Davis. Each, as former Attorneys General or, 
in the case of Mr. Davis, Solicitor General, deserved at least some twitting 
for statements made in office. The affirmative argument is essentially that 
the President has a power of "leadership," particularly in "national 
emergencies" when it becomes his duty "to save [legislative] programs 
until Congress could act." 
To sustain this premise, the argument blends together every brave act or 
daring contemplation of past Presidents, without regard to any particular 
relation to eminent domain. George Washington quashed the Whiskey 
Rebellion and proclaimed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars. The Louisi-
ana Purchase, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the breaking of the 
Pullman Strike are all recounted, and so is the defense of Iceland by 
President Roosevelt. 
The central theory of this historical assembly is that if Presidents could 
do such great deeds, they can, a fortiori, make industrial seizures. The ex-
amples cited "go far beyond the extent of power necessary to sustain the 
President's order to seize the steel mills." This is, of course, at once the 
strength and the weakness of those precedents. To take the dissenting po-
40 Ibid., at 879. 
u Ibid., at 929. 
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sition, one must apparently concede that there is no limit to "leadership" 
in "emergencies," so long as willingness to accept Congressional leader-
ship, if ever exercised, is conceded. 
(d) The future of seizure. The decision, while wisely putting general 
principle ahead of the interest of the immediate situation, nonetheless did 
leave the country with no presently available sound basis for quelling pro-
duction disruption in emergencies. The Taft-Hartley Act provides no solu-
tion at the end of its eighty day waiting period; but even more important 
is its failure to kindle that sense of fairness to both sides on which, in the 
last analysis, a successful labor program depends. In the steel case, had 
the President invoked Taft-Hartley instead of seizure, the union would 
have been stalled six months (the actual mediation period plus the puta-
tive Taft-Hartley period) with nothing to show for their delay. 
Because this is so, the Court went out of its way to make clear that the 
Congress has all the power it needs to deal fairly with the situation. The 
case is in a sense reminiscent of another steel case ten years ago. There, in 
U1tited States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,42 argued within forty-eight hours of 
Pearl Harbor, the issue was whether the government could recover money 
allegedly extracted from it by duress in the high-jacking war contracts of 
World War I. Justice Black's opinion for the Court, perceiving the inanity 
of a system of profit control left to depend on sporadic law suits twenty-
five years after the event, rejected the claim of duress and drew a clear 
picture of the power of Congress to deal with war profits instantly. With-
in two months, under the direct spur of the Bethlehem decision, Congress 
passed the first Renegotiation Act of World War II. 
In the steel seizure case, Black's opinion again specified the powers of 
Congress: 
It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws 
regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules de-
signed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain 
:fields of our economy. 43 
That is enough power to sustain any emergency labor program Congress 
may propose. The power "to settle labor disputes" will sustain even direct 
compulsory arbitration, at least within the limits of the 13th Amendment. 
At the same time, the opinions do not leave the country powerless in a 
total war emergency if Congress fails to create a system of its own. If 
total war comes, the three dissenting Justices and perhaps (with diminish-
ing degrees of certainty) Justices Burton, Clark, Jackson and Frankfurter 
42 315 u.s. 289 (1942). 
~3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 867 (1952). 
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will sustain purely executive seizure. Such a result would not be incom-
patible with their opinions here. Indeed, if the Taft-Hartley eighty day 
period expired without Congressional action, several of these Justices 
might sustain executive seizure even in a cold war period. 
The real challenge of the opinions is to Congress. Justice Jackson put 
it this way: 
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of 
Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems .... If not good law, there 
was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the 
man who can use them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in 
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through 
its fingers. 44 
Monopoly and Free Enterprise 
Unlike other recent terms, there were no momentous trade regulation 
cases in 1951-52. An economic historian doing a study of the United States 
in the 1950's would probably not give even footnote mention to any of 
this year's decisions. 
The Court did deal with a minor problem in the concentration of com-
munication. It upheld a Sherman Act injunction against a Lorain, Ohio, 
newspaper publisher who attempted to strangle a local radio station by 
refusing to accept ads for the paper from those who also advertised on the 
radio. One problem, readily solved, was that of identifying the "com-
merce" restrained, since the monopoly of the advertising was based on lo-
cal contracts in an Ohio small town.45 
The Sherman Act was not, however, broad enough to reach an alleged 
restraint on medical practice in Oregon. 46 At bottom was the resistance of 
state medical association leaders to contract, or group, medicine; but the 
actual warfare between the groups and the profession was won by the 
groups almost ten years ago. They are here to stay; the cruder forms of in-
fighting are over, and the Court held that past wars are irrelevant for pur-
poses of obtaining a decree now. With a fine intention to join what they 
could not lick, the state association then set up its own system of contract 
medicine, controlled by itself. The government proceeded against the 
state association and its affiliates, first on the ground of its attempt to 
monopolize medical practice by driving the contract groups out of busi-
ness, and second on the ground of restraint of competition in that the 
Association kept its own state contract medicine organization out of 
u Ibid., at 879-80. 
~Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
44 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326 (1952). 
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counties where Association-affiliated local groups sought the same busi-
ness. 
On the first count the Court refused an injunction, particularly in view 
of the pre-1941 age of many of the Association's misdeeds. On the second, 
it found the restraint, such as it was, not "unreasonable," since it saw no 
advantage in having the same doctors on two local lists, one sponsored by 
a state and the other by the county medical association. On this, as on the 
whole case, the decision was basically an acceptance of the facts as found 
by the trial court. Moreover, it found no commerce involved in this local 
division of the market. The Court said in essence that the "furnishing of 
prepaid medical care on a local plane" is not "interstate commerce." The 
occasional payments for the benefits of persons who moved out of state it 
found "sporadic and incidental." 
(The Court observed "in passing" that "forms of competition usual in 
the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a pro-
fession." In further recognition of the sometimes peculiar ethical sense of 
the medical and allied professions, the Court in a tax case held the third 
of the retail cost of eyeglasses kicked back by optical companies to the 
eye doctors who sent them patients was deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expense. 47 The medical profession, however, stands alone on 
this profitable island of ethics; payment of attorneys' fees for contesting 
a federal gift tax was not deductible. 48) 
A case which covered no new ground, but nonetheless made a contribu-
tion to general understanding by its succinct application of principle was 
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.49 In 1937 two patent holders on a type 
of paint formed a patent holding company to license use of their patents 
to those who would charge minimum prices for the paint. By 1948, 200 
companies, amounting to the entire industry, were licensed and the licens-
ing company had, by progressively more complicated licenses, rigidified 
the. most minute details of the sales practices of the industry. The issue in 
the action to enjoin this license system was whether, under the General 
Electric50 rule, the price :fixing was a legitimate condition of a patent 
license. The Court held that it was not legitimate, following its Line M a-
47 Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). 
48 Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952). The statutory interpretation problems in 
these two tax cases are of course wholly different, the second dealing with a gift tax provision 
which has no relevance in the first. The point being made above is only that as between two 
professions, the doctors get all the breaks. 
49 342 u.s. 371 (1952). 
50 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
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terial and U.S. Gypsu.m51 holdings that the General Electric rule does not 
sanctify patent pools; and, moreover, that industry wide license agree-
ments "establish a prima facie case of conspiracy." 
Other Problems of Business 
In 1951 there was a miscellany of unrelated business problems of no 
broad social significance. In the tax field, an extortioner is now, five to 
four, subject to income tax on the money he extorts, though an embezzler 
still is not. 52 While a high authority has informally advised this writer that 
the decision is of some consequence, it seems doubtful that because of it 
any appreciable number of extortioners will either stop their extorting or 
start sharing the proceeds with the government; and it seems equally un-
likely that any number who escape conviction on the substantive offense 
will be picked up by the Bureau. 
Government construction contracts usually provide that the depart-
ment head's conclusions of fact are final. There is an implied exception for 
cases of fraud. In United States v. Wunderliclz,53 the Court of Claims found 
a decision by the Secretary of Interior "arbitrary," "capricious" and 
"grossly erroneous." But, said the Supreme Court, this does not equate to 
fraud-the Secretary's determination is final unless he is guilty of "con-
scious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." Justices 
Douglas and Reed, dissenting, regretted giving, in practical operation, the 
power of a "ruthless master" to a contracting officer; and Justice Jackson, 
dissenting, made very clear that no precedent required this result. 
A substantial new development in the interstate tax area was Standard 
Oil Co. v. Peck. 54 It held, as a matter of due process, that Ohio might not 
place an ad valorem personal property tax on the ships of an Ohio corpo-
ration which operated on the Mississippi River, but were in Ohio waters 
only negligibly. Concededly under earlier cases, the state of corporate 
domicile had a fair claim to tax the property. The issue had been one of tax 
situs, and unless the vessel acquired tax situs elsewhere, it was presumed 
to be subject to taxation at its corporate home. Ocean going vessels, obvi-
ously wanting in situs elsewhere, were taxable at the state of incorpora-
tion;55 and so were interstate railroads and airlines.56 
61 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). 
62 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). 
53 342 u.s. 98 (1951). 64 342 u.s. 382 (1952). 
lill The leading case is Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911). 
MN,Y. Central R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). 
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The Peck case, in ending this condition for vessels on inland waters, in-
troduced a new precedent and a new nile. The precedent was Ott v. Mis-
sissippi Barge Line,57 which had held that vessels on inland waters were 
subject to taxation by a state in which they operated, so long as the tax 
was apportioned to the number of miles the vessel operated in the state. 
The case is obviously tangential, since the taxing state there was not the 
state of domicile, and the record showed that some of the property in-
volved had gained tax situs in that state. In the instant case, there was no 
showing that the vessels were with great frequency in any one state, and 
it was clear that they were not in fact taxed elsewhere. For the Court it 
was enough that they might conceivably be taxed elsewhere, and it said 
The rule which permits ta."'l:ation by two or more states on an apportionment basis 
precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile. Otherwise there 
would be multiple taxation of interstate operations and the tax would have no relation 
to the opportunities, benefits, or protection which the taxing state gives those opera-
tion. 58 
Justice Minton, dissenting, warmly protested the use of the doctrine of 
avoidance of multiple taxation when its effect, as here, was to permit the 
corporation to avoid even single taxation. 
Last of the miscellaneous business cases was the decision 59 upholding an 
old Missouri statute which provides that employees of businesses in the 
state may have up to four hours off on election days to vote-and that 
their employer must pay them for the time off. Justice Douglas, for the 
Court, conceded that "The legislative power has limit~,'' but found this 
simply another form of minimum wage requirement, and that its object of 
getting out the vote was perfectly permissible. 
The statute, though probably unwise, seems so dearly valid under the 
decisions of recent years on due process that it would go unnoticed were 
it not for the dissent of Justice Jackson. This dissent is a minor milestone 
in that it is believed to be the first occasion on which any Justice appoint-
ed in the past :fifteen years has voted to invalidate any business regulatory 
statute on the good old due process ground that the statute is so offensive 
policy-wise that it should not be allowed to stand. Justice Jackson had no 
precedents, but he excoriated the statute on the merits: 
Because a State may require payment of a minimum wage for hours that are worked 
it does not follow that it may compel payment for time that is not worked .... I do 
not question that the incentive which this statute offers will help swell the vote; to 
57 336 u.s. 169 (1949). 
ss Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 {1952). 
&9 Day-Brite Lighting, fuc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
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require that employees be paid time-and-a-half would swell it still more, and double-
time would do even better. But does the success of an enticement to vote justify putting 
its cost on some other citizen?60 
It is only the touch of a vanished hand, but even the faint sound of this 
voice once still reminds us that the natural law conception of due process, 
as applied to business regulations, may return to. our midst again. 
III. CIVIL RIGHTS 
Aside from the movie case61 and one bail case,62 human liberty made no 
important progress in any Supreme Court decisions this year. It lost con-
siderable ground. As was noted earlier, of twenty divided civil rights cases 
this year, the decision went against the claimed right in fifteen; and most 
of the remaining five cases were insubstantial. 
(a) Speech, Press, Movies. The principal free speech decision of the year 
was Adler v. Board of Education,63 upholding New York's Feinberg Law. 
A principal harassment device of the current Repression had been that of 
proving guilt not by deed, but by association; that is to say, proving the 
guilt of the accused by showing that he associated with X who associated 
with Y and so on to the Communist who polluted the whole circle, or by 
showing membership in a group which is found to have malign objectives. 
The Court had not previously come squarely to grips with that device.64 
In the Adler case it explicitly took up that matter. It found the device 
more than merely permissible; it found it just dandy. 
The Feinberg Law aimed in the general direction of protecting the 
school children of New York from Communist propaganda. One method 
of giving such protection would be to punish those who in fact actually 
propagandized students; but, as the Court synthesized the legislative find-
ing, "This propaganda ... is sufficiently subtle to escape detection in the 
class room."65 Hence the legislature sought a litmus paper test under 
which the color pink would show without the necessity of considering what 
the teacher actually did while teaching. 
It found its solution through the device of excluding from teaching 
those affiliated with offensive organizations. The actual mechanics are 
these: The State Board of Regents makes a list of organizations which 
GO Ibid., at 426-27. 
u Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
az Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
G3 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
u The case most nearly in point is Gamer v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 341 U.S. 
716 (1951), on the Los Angeles municipal oath. 
M Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 490 (1952). 
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"advocate, advise, teach, or embrace the doctrine" of either (a) forceful 
overthrow of the government, or (b) the "necessity or propriety of adopt-
ing any such doctrine." The organization may, if it will, appeal to the 
courts for review of its inclusion, although if it does not have sufficient in-
terest to do so, the individual teacher is subsequently precluded from rais-
ing the question. Membership in the organizations becomes "prima facie 
evidence of disqualification for appointment to or retention in any" 
teaching position. The suspected teacher must then present "substantial 
evidence" to rebut the presumption that he is subversive. 
Two main constitutional objections were raised to the Feinberg Law, 
one central and the other peripheral. The central objection was that under 
the First Amendment, teachers have an equal right with anyone else to be 
members of organizations when membership is not unlawful for others. 
Hence, runs the argument, their jobs can not be made dependent on legal 
political associations. The peripheral objection is that the prima facie 
presumption clause of the Act creates a presumption unconstitutional 
under the due process clause. But, under the precedents, the presumption 
is not more extreme than has been upheld before, and Justice Minton for 
the majority had no serious difficulty in overcoming this obstacle.66 The 
dissenters did not object on this point. 
The real issue is the first one, the substantive right of the individual 
teacher to belong to organizations on the list without prejudice to his po-
sition. Here Justice Minton is concise and blunt: 
1. This is not an interference with free speech because persons "have no 
right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms." 
Teachers have an option to conform or get out: "If they do not choose to 
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associa-
tions and go elsewhere. " 67 
2. Obviously, teachers may be discharged if they directly advocate 
overthrow of the government themselves, citing Gitlow v. New York. (The 
citation is of interest only because this is the first time in over twenty 
years that the Gitlow case has been cited with approval for its substantive 
holding; only last year this same Court declared that the minority rather 
than the majority opinion was the law.)68 
66 The line between permissible and impermissible presumptions in civil cases is thin, cf. 
Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (impermissible), and Mobile, J. & 
K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910) (permissible), but the Adler case seems clearly 
comparable to Turnipseed. 
sr Both quotes are from 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). 
us 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), the Chief 
Justice after discussing Gitlow said, "Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow 
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3. They may, equally, be discharged if they are members of organizations 
which have such objectives. The Court is not disturbed by the conception 
of guilt by association: "One's associates, past and present, as well as one's 
conduct, may properly be considered in determining :fitness and loyalty. 
From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined by the com-
pany he keeps. In the employment of officials and teachers of the school 
system, the state may very properly inquire into the company they keep." 
Indeed, the opinion contains words of exhortation to the effect that this 
is just what the school systems ought to do: they "have the right and the 
duty."69 
The Adler opinion, like it or not, has the great merit of candor. There is 
no aura of pretense to it, no seeming but insubstantial reservation of indi-
vidual right, not even a conventional bow to the usages of academic free-
dom. It is the legal statement of the popular aphorisms, "If he doesn't 
like it here, let him go back where he came from''; and Walter Winchell's, 
"If a bird goes around with ducks, it's a duck." 
It evoked a dissent from Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, 
which makes head on collision. The vice of the statute is guilt by associa-
tion rather than by deed. It is 
certain to raise havoc with academic freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, 
misguided enthusiasms-all long forgotten-become the ghosts of a harrowing present. 
Fearing condemnation, [the teacher] will tend to shrink from any association that stirs 
controversy. In that manner freedom of expression will be stifled. 
The law inevitably turns the school system into a spying project ..•• What was the 
significance of the reference of the art teacher to socialism? Why was the history teacher 
so openly hostile to Franco Spain? Who heard overtones of revolution in the English 
teacher's discussion of the Grapes of Wrath? •.. Where suspicion fills the air and holds 
scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect. 
[This does not at all mean that the classroom may become a Communist cell.] ••.. But 
the guilt of the teacher should tum on overt acts. So long as she is a law abiding citizen, 
so long as her performance within the public school system meets professional standards, 
her private life, her political philosophy, her social creed should not be the cause of 
reprisals against her.7o 
The most puzzling aspect of Adler is its scope. Under the recent deci-
sions, it is obvious that public employees are fair game for the loyalty 
has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that subse-
quent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." In Beauhamais v. 
Dlinois, 343 U.S. 250, 295 (1952), Justice Jackson in an individual dissent says, "As the prin-
ciple by which to judge the constitutionality of this statute, I accept the dissent in Gitlow." 
Yet both join in Adler, in which, as noted, the Gitlow majority opinion is the sole authority 
cited on the point discussed above. 
&D Both quotes are from 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). 
7° The Douglas dissent is at 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952). 
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hunt. Federal, municipal, and state loyalty programs have now been up-
held. 71 How about private employment? Can Congress or legislatures ex-
clude persons from all jobs because of their associations, or merely from 
public positions? 
The Douds case72 held that Communists could be excluded from key 
posts in labor relations, but it by no means answered the whole question 
as to the scope of power. Whether Adler moves further depends on the one 
point on which it is confusing. Was it following what might be called the 
"outlaw theory" of public employment, 73 holding essentially that public 
employees have no rights in their jobs and therefore have no standing to 
raise free speech objections if their jobs are taken from them; or, in the 
alternative, was it holding the Act valid under the First Amendment? If 
the latter, then presumably a similar act would be equally valid as to any 
employees, public or private, whom the legislature can reach with the 
police power, at least so long as they are in a "sensitive area." 
On the one hand, the opinion states the issue in terms of the absence of 
a "right" in public employment; apparently teachers have none, although 
in passing there is a suggestion that they must be dealt with on "reason-
able terms." On the other hand, the statute is justified in terms of the 
school as a "sensitive area," a center of the states' "vital concern," as to 
which the state, as quoted above, has "the right and the duty to screen 
the officials, teachers, and employees." These observations might be equal-
ly applicable to dairy employees (protection against germ warfare), em-
ployees of steel mills (there ought to be a "vital concern" in the avoidance 
of waste of materials), and television performers (Howdy Doody's propa-
ganda, if any, is certainly "sufficiently subtle to escape detection" on the 
air, and he reaches far more "young minds" than any teacher does). It is 
not clear whether or not Adler would be a precedent to uphold a law 
aimed at employees in those classes. 
The Court, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 74 did uphold one statute which 
clearly limits the speech of everyone. The issue there was the validity of 
Illinois' so-called group libel law, as applied to a person who was circulat-
ing a petition to the Chicago city council to adopt an ordinance segregat-
ing the city on racial lines. 
n Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Bailey v. Richardson, 
341 U.S. 918 (1951); and the Adler case. 
72 American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upheld an exclusionary 
statute for union officials, stressing that the number of persons involved was small and their 
positions crucial. 
73 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1942). 
74 343 u.s. 250 (1952). 
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Two documents are relevant, the statute and the petition. The statute 
makes it an offense "to manufacture, sell ... advertise or publish, present 
or exhibit" any "lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which 
publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or 
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" if 
it exposes those citizens "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or . : . is pro-
ductive of breach of the peace or riots." 
Beauharnais violated this statute by displaying a "lithograph," or 
printed matter as the Illinois Supreme Court defined that term, through 
his agents, on Chicago's street comers. The lithograph was a leaflet of 
about sixty lines plus an application form for membership in defendant's 
organization, the "White Circle League of America." The top of the leaflet 
in large type proclaimed: "Preserve and protect white neighborhoods." It 
disclaimed being "against the Negro," but spoke of the Negro "invasion" 
of the South Side of the City, alluded to Communism "rife among the 
Negroes," and asked the city authorities for action "through the exercise 
of the Police Power" to stop these Negro encroachments. 
The application form and the petition just described occupy about two 
thirds of the leaflet. It was not contended that anything in them violated 
the statute. The remaining third is an appeal for membership in the 
White Circle League to oppose the Truman civil rights program which, 
with kindred movements, has "the object of mongrelizing the white race." 
There is further need to defend against the "rapes, robberies, knives, 
guns and marihuana of the Negro." It accepts the "challenge" to the 
white race, which it proclaims will never suffer itself to be the victim of 
"forced mongrelization." 
The defendant was convicted of violating the lllinois statute, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the act. Justice Frankfurter for the 
Court described the statute as a criminal libel law. It would unquestion-
ably be libelous falsely to charge an individual "with being a rapist, rob-
ber, carrier of knives and guns, user of marihuana," and it can be equally 
libelous to say the same thing about groups. Illinois has had serious 
troubles with racial tensions, and while this legislation may very possibly 
not help, "It would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legisla-
ture a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not 
forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's power."75 The clear 
and present danger test is irrelevant, because it does not apply to libelous 
any more than to obscene speech. 
Four Justices dissented. Justice Jackson's76 was almost as much a con-
76 Ibid., at 262. 78 Ibid., at 287. 
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currence as a dissent, but was indeed provocative. In concurring vein, he 
observed that this legislation would be invalid under the First Amend-
ment, if the First Amendment were applicable; but further consideration 
had now led him to reverse his own position of many years standing that 
the First Amendment is to be considered as applicable to the states via the 
Fourteenth. That latter amendment makes not the precise terms of the 
First Amendment applicable to the states, but only "the general principle 
of free speech." Group criminal libel laws may be valid for states; this 
particular application, however, was invalid because the trial court did 
not permit the defendant to offer proof of the truth of the matter pub-
lished. In Justice Jackson's view this is part of substantive due process. 
Justice Reed,77 joined by Justice Douglas, dissented on the ground that 
the statute was void as vague, in its use of such general terms as "virtue," 
'.'derision" and "obloquy." 
Justices Black and Douglas together, and Justice Douglas individually, 
also dissented on the merits of the legislation. Justice Bla:ck's major ob-
jections were, first, that the document was a bona fide petition to lawfully 
constituted authorities asking them to take action of a sort at least argua-
bly within their powers. The right to petition is thus abridged. Second, 
the Court applies the so-called "rational basis" test to the legislation, ig-
noring the higher standard to which laws interfering with First Amend-
ment rights had previously been held. Third, group libel laws are so funda-
mentally different from individual libel laws that they should not be al-
lowed at all; so much modem legislation involves huge groups that it is 
almost impossible to talk about major areas of public affairs without run-
ning the risk of offending some group. There is nothing here for judicial 
review on a case by case basis: 
To say that a legislative body can, with this Court's approval, make it a crime to 
petition for and publicly discuss proposed legislation seems ... far-fetched to me .... I 
think the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth, "absolutely" forbids such laws 
without any "ifs" or "buts" or "whereases."78 
It remains to appraise. In this critic's opinion, the decision is unsound, 
and a most undesirable deviation from precedent, on three separate 
grounds. 
First, it is wrong on its facts. What this defendant had to say about Ne-
groes, however offensive it may be, was well within the style in which 
vast numbers of excitable Americans do talk about groups. Without ques-
tion, the defendant was within his rights in petitioning for a system of seg-
77 Ibid., at 277. 
78 Ibid., at 275. 
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regation by zoning. Just such legislation, though probably unconstitution-
al in any guise,79 has been familiar enough in American cities, and Ameri-
cans ought to be free, however mistaken their motives, to try to devise 
a valid separation system if they want to. Equally, the defendant is with-
in his rights in organizing to resist the President's civil rights program; a 
minor political party, dominant in some Southern states in 1948, took a po-
sition much more extreme and vigorous than his, and, most seriously, 
it would presumably be illegal for their candidate for President to cam-
paign in lllinois under this decision. 
The only passage of the leaflet which conceivably portrays Negro "de-
pravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue" is the line which refers 
to their "rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marihuana." This is approxi-
mately one per cent of the leaflet, buried in its middle; and while it is not 
nice talk, it certainly reaches no new depths in the hyperbole of American 
politics. 
The factual aspects of the case are worth dwelling on because they high-
light the evil of this kind of legislation. Granting that the First Amend-
ment is not an absolute, and that grave enough circumstances may war-
rant suspension of the right of speech, this passing nastiness is no sub-
stantial menace to anything. Every repression of free speech, on the other 
hand, is a menace to an American ideal. 
Second, it is wrong on its law. The most significant aspect of the case is 
the ultimate triumph of the so-called "rational basis" approach of Justice 
Frankfurter to the testing of state legislation challenged under the First 
Amendment. In this the Justice has been more consistent than the Court. 
The battle began with the flag salute cases, in which Justice Frankfurter 
was driven to momentary defeat, still proclaiming that flag salute legisla-
tion was valid because legislators might rationally suppose that such legis-
lation promoted the legitimate goal of national unity.80 It was Justice 
Stone first,81 and Justice Jackson later,82 who proclaimed the counter phi-
losophy that, where the First Amendment is involved, a rational basis is 
not enough to support legislation. 
The standard of review in this area is dispositive of the case. If a legisla-
tive rational basis is enough to sustain a requirement that children salute 
the flag each morning, for example, then that requirement should be held 
"Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
8° Cf. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
81 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
82 In the Barnette case, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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valid for it is not irrational in the sense of being fraudulent, capricious, or 
downright deranged. It is simply wrong. So with the group libel law; it is 
not legislative madness, it is simply legislative error. 
Of late, the Court has been tacitly but n<?t avowedly applying the ra-
tional basis test to free speech restrictions. In- the Beauharnais case it 
comes all the way and gives the name to the deed. Justice Jackson re-
cants, 83 the rest of the majority is substantially entirely post-Stone, and 
Justice Frankfurter marches triumphantly along in the same path he has 
regularly followed. Persistence wins, and perhaps the flag salute will again 
have a turn at being valid if it comes back again. 
But the late Chief Justice Stone was right in the first place. He con-
tended that First Amendment rights could not be left to the chance of 
legislative experimentation because repression of those rights blocks the 
one device by which electorate can induce the legislature to change its 
mind; an "experiment" with the suppression of free speech has the lasting 
qualities of an experiment with suicide. Justice Frankfurter concedes that 
this may be bad legislation, but says that this "is the price to be paid for 
the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate so-
cial issues."84 
But the very statute in question blocks the path of its repeal. This is 
no case of, e.g., anti-oleomargarine legislation which may be passed today 
and repealed tomorrow. The only people with a substantial, nontheoreti-
cal interest in repealing the Illinois group libel law are those who have 
something critical they want to say about Negroes, Jews, Italians, Irish, 
Catholics, Spanish Americans or some other group. This one may want the 
law repealed so that he may campaign more effectively, as Beauharnais 
campaigned, for a greater degree of segregation. That one may want it 
repealed so that he can more freely oppose a Presidential candidate who 
endorses a Fair Employment Practices Commission. A third wants to pro-
tect public school funds from what he sincerely regards as a "Catholic 
menace." 
None of them can candidly attempt to build up popular support for the 
repeal of this legislation without stating their ~Jnderlying objectives, and 
yet they can not state their objectives without risking violation of this 
vague, shotgun type law they seek to repeal. In this field, experimentation 
is stopped dead. 
Third, the case is wrong in priJ?.ciple. Beauharnais certainly has a right 
83 Indeed, Justice Jackson in effect repudiated his former position in American Communica-
tion Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,423 n. 1 (1950). 
84 Beauharnais v. Dlinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952). 
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to say that some Negroes are marihuana users, knife carriers, and rapists. 
He also had a right to imply that all are. There is social loss in permitting 
him such conduct; but the country was committed 160 years ago to the 
proposition that the resultant gain in freedom is worth the loss. As Justice 
Jackson's opinion shows, there is no substantial difference between the 
Illinois law and the Sedition Act of 1798 except that the former forbids 
disparagement of racial and religious groups, and the latter forbade dis-
paragement of political groups.85 The National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People rose far above self-interest in opposing this 
prosecution. 
The major, and indeed the only, "pro" free speech cases of the year were 
those concerned with movie censorship. In the Miracle case,86 the Court 
caught up with an anachronism. 
In 1915, the Court in theM utual Film case87 held that the First Amend-
ment and the Fourteenth were irrelevant to movie censorship; that movies 
were simply and exclusively business of producing spectacles for profit, 
and not any "part of the press of the country," or of any concern as 
"organs of public opinion." 
This may have been true in those pre-Birth of a Nation days; but 
scarcely anyone would now doubt that movies, though still profit seekers 
in the same sense that the press seeks profit, have become a most impor-
tant "organ of public opinion." While the proportion of its focus on public 
matters is much smaller than that of the press, its practical effectiveness 
may be far greater.88 
In the Miracle decision, the Court finally overruled the Mutual Film 
case and held that movies, too, are entitled to at least some kind of freedom 
from censorship. 
Tlze Miracle is a forty minute film produced in Italy, in Italian with 
English subtitles. Its subject is the seduction of a demented goat tender by 
someone she supposes to be St. Joseph, and her resultant illusion that she 
has conceived immaculately. There are sharp differences of opinion among 
85 The parallel language is: Tilinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 38, § 471: "manufacture, 
sell, or offer for sale, advertise, or publish" the named categories of publications "which publi-
cation portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens ... 
and •.. exposes the citizens of any race •.. to contempt, derision, or obloquy." The Sedition 
Act, 1 Stat. 570 (1798): "write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Con-
gress of the United States or the President of the United States, with intent to defame •.. or 
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute. 
86 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
87 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
88 The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., Inglis, Freedom of the Movies (1947). 
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the acquaintances of this writer who have seen it as to whether it is, by 
ordinary movie-goer standards, a good or a poor movie; but no one has 
suggested that it is, in a pornographic sense, vulgar. Reviewers comments 
are collected in a note to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion which 
shows that professional opinions ranged from "leaves a very bad taste in 
one's mouth" (N.Y. Herald Tribune) to "overpowering and provocative" 
(N.Y. Times).89 
Under New York censorship law, licenses are to be given by a state of-
ficial supervising movie censorship unless the movie is "obscene, indecent, 
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or ... would tend to corrupt morals or in-
cite to crime." This movie was licensed under that statute, and ran for 
eight weeks at a small New York specialty theater which concentrates on 
foreign productions. 
During this period the picture was denounced as sacrilegious by New 
York's Cardinal Spellman and was picketed by the Catholic War Veter-
ans. 90 The state licensing authority thereupon re-inspected the picture, 
found it sacrilegious, and withdrew its license. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Clark, suggested that movies, for 
the very reason of their great impact on the popular mind, might have to 
be subject to community control; but that this necessity, even if it exists, 
"does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have 
here." TheM utzeal Film case, it observed, antedated the whole conception 
that freedom of speech and of the press were protected in any degree by 
the Fourteenth Amendment; and the case was overruled as obsolete. 
Since movies may not be subject to unlimited censorship, the next ques-
tion considered by Justice Clark is whether the particular kind of censor-
ship used inN ew York is permissible. It is not valid because, says the Jus-
tice, it is a previous restraint, a licensing device which is to be especially 
condemned unless there is some special justification for it. Such a special 
justification would have to be a narrow exception, and a test as elusive as 
"sacrilegious" is far too imprecise to do. Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and 
Jackson concurred specially, the Frankfurter-Jackson opinion concluding 
that the term "sacrilegious," as used by the New York authorities, has no 
meaning with which a court can review an administrative agency. 
A week after the Miracle decision the Court reversed without opinion 
(other than the citation of the Miracle case and one other decision on the 
8 9 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 n. 14 (1952). 
90 These details are taken from Justice Frankfurter's opinion which also makes clear that 
Catholic opinion here and abroad was by no means unanimously opposed to the circulation of 
the movie. On the merits of the movie itself, the Washington rumor is that at least some of the 
Justices who saw the film thought it very poor entertainment. 
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.  31 1952-1953
1952] THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1951-52 31 
requirement of statutory definiteness) a Texas decision upholding the con-
viction of a Texas theater operator who displayed the movie Pinky after 
being denied a license by local censors. 91 Pinky, an American made movie, 
is the story of a Negro girl so close to the color line that she passed as 
white in the North, became engaged to a white man there, and then re-
turned to the South. The Texas censorship authorities found the film ob-
jectionable for reasons related to the fact that it suggested, without com-
plete disapprobation, the possibility of "miscegenation." 
The Miracle and Pi1tky cases require either the scuttling or the rewrit-
ing of state movie censorship laws. Such laws have as their purpose the de-
sire to prevent obscenity or other offenses against dominant religious, eco-
nomic, or pressure groups. Justice Clark's opinion is particularly careful 
to put aside without a ruling the question of obscenity when raised "under 
a clearly-drawn statute." 
While the decision is momentous and long overdue, its practical conse-
quences in terms of movies to be seen are likely to be extremely narrow. 
Pinky is an extreme exception among American movies in dealing with a 
controversial subject; and the Legion of Decency and private censorship 
within the industry would have strangled Tlze Miracle, if it had been an 
American production, long before it reached the New York censorship of-
fice. The industry shivers under attack from anyone with a loud voice, and 
at the moment is in the process of sifting over 200 of its personnel for no 
better reason than that the American Legion has some doubts about 
them. 92 The largest practical results may be to a few so-called "art thea-
ters" around the country, where foreign films reach only a trifling audi-
ence. 
But, in the long run, it may have the effect of contributing a little cour-
age to a TV-scared, pressure-group-scared, Un-American-Activities-
scared industry. At least the producers, if they can't talk back to anyone 
else, can now at least have the pleasure of cocking a snoot at the police-
man. 
(b) Religion. Four years ago the Court, in McCollum '11. Board of Educa-
tion, 93 invalidated the Champaign, Illinois, release time system for giving 
religious education to children in the public schools. The result bas been a 
v1 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952). 
92 N.Y. Times§ 1, p. 1, col. 2 (May 23, 1952); N.Y. Times§ 2, p. 1, col. 1 Uune 1, 1952). 
u 333 U.S. 203 (1948). For a collection of references to the abundant literature on the sub-
ject, see Note to the McCollum case in Frank, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 874 
(rev. ed., 1952). 
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:flood of debate, pro and con, which has by far eclipsed all other Supreme 
Court decisions of the last decade in popular attention. 
At the term just passed, it turned out that theM cCollum case had need-
lessly excited the public; it was all a matter of form. The lllinois system 
had offended aganst the constitutional principle of separation of church 
and state in two respects; first, the religious education, though carried on 
by private instructors, was physically on the school property; and second; 
the whole school machinery was used to insure that the children whose 
parents wished them to attend the religious training did in fact do so. 
This year in Zorach v. Clauson94 the Court upheld the New York release 
time system. That system differed from the Champaign system in one, and 
one only, important respect; the religious education was off the school 
premises. Otherwise the school machinery was used in the same way to 
round up the children and deliver them to their religious tutors. 
The Zorach case falls about half-way between an overruling and a dis-
tinction of the McCollum decision. In its most important respects, it limits 
to the point of overruling. In McCollum the Court had separately stated 
the vices of the Champaign system; "not only" were the public school 
buildings used, but "also" the compulsory school machinery was used to 
insure the presence of the children in religious classes. This latter element, 
alluded to as a separate and distinct item, had been termed "not separa-
tion of church and state." As Justice Jackson, dissenting in Zorach, said, 
"The distinction attempted between [McCollum] and this is trivial, almost 
to the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparag-
ing compulsion which was the underlying reason for invalidity."95 
On the other hand, Justice Douglas, for the 6-3 majority, found no in-
consistency; after all, in McCollum, in which he was of the majority, the 
religious education had been on school property, and here it was not. Par-
ents and students have a free choice as to whether they will take the reli-
gious education or not. (So, in equal degree, did they in McCollum.) Too 
many concessions cannot be made to the "fastidious atheist or agnostic." 
This is not mingling of church and state; it is merely a "systematized pro-
gram" of "cooperation." After all, "We are a religious people whose insti-
tutions presuppose a Supreme Being," and the Constitution does not re-
quire "a callous indifference to religious groups." This is mere neutrality, 
a suspension of governmental operations "as to those who want to repair 
to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction." "We follow the 
McCollum case" without expanding it into "hostility to religion." 
94 343 u.s. 306 (1952). 
115 Ibid., at 325. 
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The majority opinion is by no means a complete concession to the anti-
McCollum point of view; for example, it reaffirms the McCollum dictum 
that "Government may not finance religious groups." But it does under-
cut McCollum to the extent that it approves religious education during 
school time, the school stimulating the taking of the religious training by 
occupying the remaining children with busy work and by directing the 
religious students, with all the force of the schools' prestige behind the 
directive, to go the place of religious training. As Justice Douglas notes, it 
is not clear ]rem tlze record whether "the public schools enforce attendance 
at religious schools by punishing absentees from the released time pro-
grams for truancy." What we do not know from the record, we do know 
as a matter of fact. Under the New York system, "In enforcing the truan-
cy law upon release time truants, some school districts interview the child 
to find out why he did not attend the religious instruction. Other districts, 
if the child is frequently truant, refuse him permission to be released for 
religious instruction. Still others use these techniques jointly."96 In other 
words, the schools use truancy pressures to insure the delivery of their 
charges. 
The very reason that such facts are not in the record is the occasion of 
the dissent of Justice Frankfurter. There is no factual record in the 
Zorach case, and there should have been. The complaint alleged that the 
children are in fact coerced into attendance. The majority concedes that 
if in fact there was coercion, the practice would be unconstitutional. Yet 
the trial court refused to permit the introduction of that very evidence, 
considering it irrelevant. As Justice Frankfurter says, "When constitu-
tional issues turn on facts, it is a strange procedure indeed not to permit 
the facts to be established."97 
But the largest vice of the decision is less its holding than its tone. It 
adopts as precedents the very practices that were considered relevant only 
by the single dissenting Justice in theM cCollum case. 98 Its passing deroga-
tion of the "fastidious agnostic," its approval of "cooperation" between 
church and state, betoken a retreat which may extend across the boards. 
Justice Black, author of McCollum and dissenter here, was unrepentant 
of his earlier stand. Recognizing the "searching examination" to which 
McCollum had been exposed in the intervening years, he chose the occa-
sion "to reaffirm my faith in the fundamental philosophy" expressed 
116 Released Time Reconsidered: The New York Plan Is Tested, 61 Yale L.J. 405 (1952). 
87 343 u.s. 306, 322 (1952). 
gs E.g., prayers in legislatures, the Thanksgiving Day proclamations, "So help me God" in 
the courtroom, etc. 
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earlier. In the instant case, "the sole question is whether New York can 
use its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get attendants 
presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by the pressure 
of this state machinery." Whatever else it is, this is no separation of church 
and state, and "Government should not be allowed, under cover of the 
soft euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the sacred area of religious 
choice."99 
As for practical consequences, release time involved about 2,000,000 
students in 2,200 communities across the country in 1952.100 About eleven 
per cent of the school systems abandoned released time altogether after 
McCollum, four state Attorneys General interpreting McCollum as requir-
ing this. Others had, after McCollum, retreated a step by taking released 
time out of the schoolhouse proper, and following the New York system. 
These systems are now saved; those who· abandoned released time alto-
gether after McCollum may now, if they wish, put it back in this faintly 
modified form. 
(c) Privacy. One of the troubles with modern government and with 
modern science, for all their virtues, is that as each expands it becomes 
harder and harder for the individual to draw into himself and be alone if 
he wishes. This right of privacy, this capacity of the law abiding individual 
to be some place where neither his government, nor salesmen, nor anyone 
else can get at him ought to be the last bulwark of human dignity in this 
mechanical age. Our affirmative liberties,101 our right to speak, our right 
to petition-perhaps these must dwindle in the world in which we live. If 
they must, then at least we should preserve a liberty to be let alone. 
When Brandeis wrote his seminal article on the right of privacy in 1890, 
he foretold the day when man would be tracked to his last lair by snoop-
ing, penetrating mechanical gadgets.102 When Orwell composed his night-
mare of 1984, the ultimate horror he could think of in the extremest 
reaches of the destruction of human dignity and independence was the 
telescreen by which Big Brother could know everything happening in a 
man's house.103 
V9 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952). 
100 The facts here are taken from the Note, op. cit. supra note 96. 
101 The phrase is suggested by Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 22 (1949). 
102 "[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "Warren and Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890). 
103 The comparison with Orwell is suggested in Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in the case 
about to be discussed, United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 311, 317 (C.A. 2d, 1951). 
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Episode one. On Lee, a Chinese laundryman who doubtless peddled 
opium in his spare time, was out on bail pending his trial. He was running 
his laundry and minding his own business when Chin Poy, a former em-
ployee, dropped in for a visit. What On Lee did not know-who would? 
-was that Chin Poy was wired for sound with a Dick Tracy-like gadget 
which carried the conversation to a Narcotics Bureau agent some distance 
away. The conversation, as reported by the agent, was introduced into 
evidence against On Lee and was challenged as a violation of the search 
and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, of the Federal Commu-
nications Act, and of general principles- of fair play. 
Episode two. In February, 1949, the Capital Transit Co., to pick up an 
extra $15,264 a year, began broadcasting a conglomerate of music, news, 
announcements, and ads on an eight hour a day schedule on 212 busses 
and streetcars. The return to Capital went up as more units were added. 
Most Washingtonians work in a fairly small area, in which there is not 
enough parking space to handle even a small part of the employees should 
they use their own cars. Taxis are no regular solution. The practical result 
is that most Washingtonians are a captive audience and are compelled to 
listen to Capital's choice of entertainment and salesmanship whether they 
want to or not. While similar captive audience salesmanship applied to the 
crowds in Grand Central Station in New York was prohibited by state 
authorities after a vigorous popular protest led by TheN ew Yorker maga-
zine, the District of Columbia Public Service Commission refused to for-
bid the practice for Capital Transit. For what relevance it has, it should 
be noted that a substantial majority of Capital's passengers approved of 
the programs.104 
Resume. Under this year's Supreme Court decisions, Capital Transit's 
passengers must listen to its radio or stay home.105 Chin Poy's distant 
friend in the Narcotics Bureau may lawfully eavesdrop by radio to hear 
On Lee.106 
The trouble with the practices underlying these decisions is that in the 
war between man and machine, they give all the edge to the machine. 
The captive au:lience bus case, of co:urse, presents a problem hard to 
solve through constitutional law. The radio broadcasting may be offensive 
and a nuisance, but it is difficult to turn it into a violation of due process. 
104 The facts are taken from the opinion of the Court, Public Utilities Com'll'n v. Pollack, 
343 U.S. 451 (1952). The preference data are based on a self-serving poll taken at the Com-
pany's behest, and the questions as set forth in the opinion seem sufficiently loaded to make 
precise estimates dubious. The net effect, however, is clearly one of passenger acceptance. 
105 Ibid. 
1011 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952). 
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However, it is not impossible; the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia (Edgerton, Fahy, and Bazelon, JJ) found it a deprivation of a 
liberty to be let alone, at least as to the commercials and the announce-
ments.107 Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Supreme Court, thought that 
even on busses and streetcars, there is a right to be free of "coercion to 
make people listen." He conceded that these particular programs were not 
propaganda-slanted, "But the vice is inherent in the system. Once privacy 
is invaded, privacy is gone. Once a man is forced to submit to one type of 
radio program, he can be forced to submit to another."~08 
Justice Burton, for the majority, did not go so far as to say that the in-
dividual loses all right of privacy when he steps into a commercial vehicle; 
but there is no perceptible or identifiable amount left. The right of priva-
cy, said Justice Burton, "is substantially limited by the rights of others 
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public 
conveyance." The criterion for the Public Service Commission is not pri-
vacy, but "general public convenience, comfort and safety."~09 
The New Yorker, still resisting, gloomily pondered the consequences if 
the next advertising stunt should be the spraying of the busses by a per-
fume company. Whether scent or sound, it concluded, "The franchise of 
a bus company should not include the right to spray anybody with any-
thing at all."110 
Bus broadcasting is annoying, perhaps, but it is less serious by itself 
than as a token of things to come in the direction of forced listening. More-
over, it takes highly creative and extraordinarily novel constitutional law 
to do anything about it. But On Lee's case is deadly serious by itself, and 
as to it there W?-S no appreciable balance of doctrine in favor of the 
majority. 
The closest precedents are the Olmstead and Goldman cases.111 In Olm-
stead, the Court, 5 to 4, upheld wiretapping as a reasonable search and 
seizure. The decision evoked the famous Holmes protest against "dirty 
business." In Goldman, the Court, 5 to 3, held that the attachment of a 
detectaphone to the outside of a room for the purpose of magnifying 
sounds within and thus eavesdropping on conversations was not substan-
tially different from wiretapping, and therefore was permissible. 
1o1 191 F. 2d 450 (C.A. D.C., 1951). 
1os Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952). 
1o9 Ibid., at 464-65. 
uo 28 The New Yorker, No. 16, at 17 (June 7, 1952). 
m Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129 (1942). 
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Those decisions ought to be overruled; they narrow individual privacy 
to the point of disappearance. But they at least did not permit the police 
to hide their gadgets on the inside of a man's home. Judge Jerome Frank, 
in his comprehensive and persuasive dissent in the Court of Appeals, 
readily distinguished Olmstead: "There the Court held that wiretapping 
did not violate the Amendment, basing its decision in large part on the 
fact that interception of the phone message involved no entry. The Court 
said, 'There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.' This 
fact the Court noted :five times."112 
In On Lee's case the Supreme Court chose to ignore that distinction, 
obscuring all that is important behind the fact that, since Chin Poy was 
a licensed invitee, this was not really trespass in the classic sense. But who 
cares? If carrying a secret broadcasting device into a man's place of busi-
ness or home is not the trespass Lord Coke had in mind, then the concept 
of trespass needs to catch up with twentieth century scientific ingenuity. 
Justice Black dissented on the ground that, without regard to the 
search and seizure problem, such practices should not be allowed by the 
Supreme Court in its capacity as supervisory authority over federal crimi-
nal justice. Justice Burton embraced the position of Judge Frank below, 
getting over the trespass point with the practical observation that carry-
ing in the transmitter amounted to surreptitiously bringing in the agent 
with him. Justice Douglas dissented on the broader ground that he had 
erred years before in accepting Goldman; it and Olmstead should be over-
ruled for the "decisive factor is the invasion of privacy against the com-
mand of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments."113 
Justice Frankfurter dissented in an eloquent short statement.114 He 
would not "approve legally what we disapprove morally .... The con-
trast between morality professed by society and immorality practiced on 
its behalf makes for contempt of law." Since we first approved wiretap-
ping, "we have gone from inefficiency to inefficiency, from corruption to 
corruption." This method of law enforcement "puts a premium on force 
and fraud, not on imagination and enterprise and professional training." 
The great insight of Justice Frankfurter's position is its identification 
of the moral vice of snooping. That vice is bad enough when it brings an 
undoubtedly guilty opium peddler to book. But there is no way to confine 
its use to the guilty. The disheartening aspect of Justice Burton's opinion 
is its refusal to take the great social issue of privacy out of the context of 
trespass and consider it in terms of human dignity. 
m United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 312 (1951). 
113 United States v. On Lee, 72 S. Ct. 967, 977 (1952). 114 Ibid., at 974-76. 
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Tacitus, in the Annals, describes the ways of informers in the reign of 
Tiberi us: They did not distinguish "between kinsfolk and strangers, be-
tween friends and unknown persons, between things of yesterday and 
things obscured by time. Words uttered in the street, or across the dinner-
table, on any subject whatever, were noted for accusation, every man hur-
rying to be first to make down his victim; some few acting in self-defence, 
the greater number as if infected by some contagious malady."115 
The way to stamp out prying by electricity is to make its fruits useless 
and thus put some limitation on our own usage of Tiberius. Even with-
out such gadgets, in Washington today the casual banter of cocktail 
hour chatter has been known to be turned in to the authorities by guests 
within twenty-four hours. If secret devices such as that used to con-
vict On Lee are permitted, what host can know as he looks around his 
own dinner table whether every word uttered is being recorded on a dis-
tant sound track? Suc;h fears are not far-fetched. As Judge Frank's dissent 
points out, this was done in Nazi Germany where secret conversations had 
to be held in bathrooms because they were more di:.ffi.cult to tap. 
(d) Immigrants. Rep. Albert Johnson, author of the Immigration Act of 
1924, caught the spirit of that time in a phrase when he said, "The day of 
unalloyed welcome to all peoples, the day of indiscriminate acceptance of 
all races, has definitely ended."116 In 1952, in a new McCarran Act passed 
over the veto of President Truman, the Congress reaffirmed the basic 
principles of Rep. Johnson's Act; but despite Rep. Johnson's vigilance, in 
1952 rascals were still in our midst, and the McCarran Act took vigorous 
steps to see that they did not remain. 
American immigration policy since the Revolution has been a peculiar 
mixture of xenophobia, or hysterical fear of strangers, and encouragement 
of settlement. President Truman's veto message on the McCarran Act, 
after blasting at the national origins quota system as "based upon assump-
tions at variance with American ideals," then turned to the effect of the 
Act upon aliens already within our borders: "Our resident aliens would be 
more easily separated from homes and families under grounds of deporta-
tion, both new and old, which would specifically be made retroactive. Ad-
mission to our citizenship would be made more di:.ffi.cult; expulsion from 
our citizenship would be made easier. Certain rights of native-born, first 
generation Americans would be limited .... Some of the new grounds of 
deportation which the bill would provide are unnecessarily severe." Re-
ferring to the provision authorizing deportation for undefined "activities 
115 1 Ramsey, Annals of Tacitus, Book VII-4, 367 (1904). 
115 Garis, Immigration Restrictions viii (1927). 
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'prejudicial to the public interest,' " the President said, "These provisions 
are worse than the infamous Alien Act of 1798, passed in a time of national 
fear and distrust of foreigners, which gave the President power to deport 
any alien deemed 'dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.' 
... Such powers are inconsistent with our Democratic ideals."117 
Senator McCarran described the President's veto as an "un-American-
Act" by which the President "has adopted the doctrine promulgated by 
the Daily Worker." The Congress passed the bill over the President's 
veto.ns 
During the same months that Congress was legislating, the Court was 
deciding cases of vital concern to aliens. Nothing that was decided will 
disturb Senator McCarran. Indeed, after the decision of the most impor-
tant case of the year concerning aliens, Harisiades 'D. Shaughnessy, Senator 
McCarran announced that the opinion of the Court "amply justified" the 
position he had been holding.ll9 
· The two major decisions concerning aliens were the Harisiades case and 
Carlson 'D. Landon.l20 The issue in the Harisiades case was the validity of 
the provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 for deportation of 
Communists even though party membership might have terminated be-
fore the passage of the Act. Of the group of cases presented under this 
name, the most extreme was that of Mascitti, an Italian who came to this 
country in 1920 at sixteen, was associated with Communist organizations 
from 1923 to 1929 and has been completely dissociated from such activi-
ties since that time. He has an American wife and child. The main issues 
were whether the Act denies due process, abridges freedom of speech, or 
is ex post facto. 
Justice Jackson, for a Court which divided six to two, upheld the Act.121 
He first reaffirmed the broad power of Congress to deport aliens; their 
"ambiguous status within the country is not [a] right but is a matter of 
111 The message is taken from N.Y. Times § 1, p. 14, col. 7 (June 26, 1952). 
118 Ibid. 
111342 U.S. 580 (1952); the quotation of Senator McCarran is from N.Y. Times §1, p. 1, 
col. 6 (Mar. 11, 1952). 
12o 342 U.S. 524 (1952). Minor cases concerning aliens were Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 
(1952), holding that the power of the Attorney General to deport alien enemies to Germany 
ended with the Joint Resolution of Congress terminating the war with Germany; Bindczyck v. 
Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951), holding that denaturalization proceedings must be brought in 
federal courts exclusively; and United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952), upholding a 
criminal penalty applies to aliens who have been ordered deported and fail to make timely 
application for passports. 
m The quotes following are from the Jackson opinion at 342 U.S. 581, 586-87, 590, 5911 
5941 and the J!rankf1,1rter opinion at 597-981 6101 and the Douslas opinion at 599. 
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permission a_nd tolerance." The most the alien has is "a precarious 
tenure." 
This raises for the Court the question of whether there is any limitation 
at all on the deportation power, whether Congress can be utterly capri-
cious. Says the Justice, "[We] must tolerate what personally we may re-
gard as a legislative mistake." 
Justice Jackson reasons it through this way: We cannot say that "con-
gressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power without and Com-
munist conspiracy within the United States is either a fantasy or a pre-
tense." After all, the Constitution does not obstruct the draft of the soldier 
who "is transported to foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism. If 
Communist aggression creates such hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard 
to :find justification for holding that ... its hardships must be spared the 
Communist alien." 
This, I submit, is not argument. It is the substitution of a red, white and 
blue hair shirt for the traditional judicial costume. The issue is not wheth-
er the United States has power to :fight Communism with all its might, nor 
whether aliens shall be coddled while citizens bleed. The issue is whether 
an alien who stopped being a Communist as soon as he reached maturity, 
and that many years ago, can be deported. It sheds no light on that ques-
tion to weep over the Flag. 
But the issue, the Court suggests, is not judicial, it is political. Justice 
Frankfurter, concurring, says, "whether immigration laws have been 
crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general 
or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Con-
gress .... [T]he place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens 
is the Congress, not this Court." 
Justice Douglas, dissenting, joined by Justice Black, would overrule the 
1893 decision which gave to Congress these awesome powers over aliens. 
Under the de_cisions, aliens are entitled to due process in relation to the 
minor regulations of their lives or their businesses; they are entitled to fair 
trial, to habeas corpus, to equal rights of employment. "If those rights, 
great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more impor-
tant one-the right to remain here-has a like dignity." The dissent con-
cedes that Congress has some right to uproot aliens and break up their 
families, but this should be done only on an actual showing of their men-
ace. Here Congress "has ordered these aliens deported not for what they 
are but for what they once were. Perhaps a hearing would show that they 
continue to be people dangerous and hostile to us. But the principle of 
forgiveness and the doctrine of redemption are too deep in our philosophy 
to admit that there is no return for those who have once erred." 
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Justice Jackson's opinion also touches the two remaining points. As for 
the argument that the statute denies the aliens free speech by precluding 
their membership in political parties others may still join, the matter is 
decided against the alien by the Dennis case upholding the conviction of 
the Communist leaders. As for the argument that the law is ex post facto, 
punishing conduct that was not illegal when committed, there is a simple 
answer. The ex post facto clause applies only to criminal penalties. As Mr. 
Mascitti says good-bye to his home, his family, his job, and returns to 
take up his life again in an Italy be bas not been in since be left it as a boy 
thirty-two years ago, be will have the comfort of knowing that he has been 
convicted of no crime. As Justice Jackson says, "Deportation, however 
severe its consequences, bas been consistently classified as a civil rather 
than a criminal procedure." 
In Carlson v. Landon, 122 the issue was whether the Attorney General 
might cause to be held without bail, at his own discretion, aliens charged 
with being Communists. The case is dramatized by the fact that at the 
same Term, in Stack v. Boyle, 123 the Court held that citizens charged under 
the criminal law with offenses as Communists were entitled to bail on the 
same basis as all other persons accused of crime. 
The result of the two cases put together is that citizens charged with 
Communism as a substantive crime are entitled to bail until they are 
proven guilty. Aliens, caught up in the "civil proceedings" of deportation 
are not entitled to bail until they are proven guilty. Since the Attorney 
General obviously can not personally pass on all these cases, the practical 
effect is that the Immigration Service can, at it<; own discretion, put aliens 
in jail indefinitely. The sole limitation is the case of "clear abuse," a 
standard which will rarely be met. 
The substantial question in the case is whether elimination of bail vio-
lates the mandate of the Eighth Amendment, "Excessive bail shall not be 
required .... "Justice Reed124 for the Court disposes of the point neatly. 
The Eighth Amendment provides only that bail shall not be excessive 
where there is bail. It is one thing to say that bail may not be too high, and 
quite another to say that it may not be refused altogether. As Justice 
Burton replied in dissent, "The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the 
one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so excessive in amount as 
to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under like circumstances it 
does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to the same thing." 
The decision was :five to four, and there were additional separate dis-
sents by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. 
122 342 u.s. 524 (1952). 123 342 u.s. 1 (1951). 
12
' The discussion by Justice Reed is at 342 U.S. 544; that by Justice Burton, ibid., at 569. 
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Justice Black described the denial of bail as "shocking," and likely to 
amount to a life sentence for a mere charge, particularly for one elderly 
petitioner and for another whose health was bad and whose case had al-
ready been in leisurely bureaucratic and court proceedings for four years. 
He stressed the case of one petitioner, Zydok, in this country for thirty-
nine years, who had :five grandchildren, whose sons were in the army, and 
who himself, while working as a waiter, sold $50,000 worth of war bonds 
and donated blood seven times during World War II. He thought it a 
denial of due process to deny bail to persons concerning whom there was 
not even a suspicion that they might leave the jurisdiction. As for the 
Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment, it could be given "this weird, 
devitalizing interpretation" only "when scrutinized with a hostile eye." 
Justice Frankfurter most persuasively argued that the practice of making 
aliens "unbailable" was not authorized by the statute claimed to sup-
port it.125 
(e) Race Relations. The only significant race relations decision of the 
year was Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,126 pushing a step far-
ther the doctrine that the Brotherhoods could not expect to be exclusive 
bargaining agents for their Negro members if the brotherhoods them-
selves were going to discriminate against the Negroes because of race. 
Of highest interest is a matter on the horizon for the 1952 term. 
Throughout the year the Court engaged in the most remarkable process 
of delay of consideration of two cases challenging grade school segregation, 
one from Kansas and the other from South Carolina. After holding the 
South Carolina petition for certiorari on its docket for months, the Court 
sent it back to the trial court for almost superfluous further proceedings, 
from which it quickly returned, and the Kansas case was allowed to lie 
unnoticed on the docket all year. At the end of term, both cases were ac-
cepted for argument in the Fall.127 
The most likely explanation of this highly unusual procedure is that the 
Court wished to avoid consideration of so inflammable a topic in an elec-
125 The Black dissent is at 342 U.S. 547; that of Justice Frankfurter, ibid., at 558. 
126 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952). 
127 The South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), was appealed by the Ne-
groes involved because the order of the trial court provided only that the school facilities should 
be equalized, rather than that segregation was unconstitutional per se. The Court remanded 
the case for further consideration of a report filed in the trial court on the factual issue of segre-
gation, a report the trial court would not have had if the Supreme Court had not delayed action 
four months and, moreover, a report which was irrelevant to the only issue on which the appel-
lants sought review. Justices Black and Douglas, noting the irrelevancy, thought the case 
should be set for argument at once. On the last day of the term, the Court did grant a new 
appeal from the consideration of that report, 72 S. Ct. 1078 (1952). The appeal was followed in 
the Kansas case at the same time, Brown v. Board of Education, 72 S. Ct. 1070 (1952). 
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tion year. The Court's decision of Morgan v. Virginia128 became an issue 
in the election of 1948 which helped unseat Governor Arnall in Georgia 
and send Governor Talmadge into office. The decision of Sweatt v. Pain-
ter129 between the first and second primaries inN orth Carolina in 1950 was 
undoubtedly the factor which unseated liberal Senator Frank Graham of 
that state and sent Willis Smith to the Senate. The Court can scarcely be 
blamed if it wants to insure that the decision of this question should be 
unencumbered by thoughts about November, 1952. 
(f) Contempt. On October 13th, 1949, as reported by Life Magazine a 
few days later, Judge Harold Medina, at the end of the great Communist 
trial, sternly "called the Communists' lawyers before him and, as the 
courtroom gasped, gave six of them sentences varying from 30 days to six 
months in jail for contempt of court. Judge Medina's frown gave way to a 
look of sober satisfaction as he turned, his black robes swirling softly, and 
then proceeded from the courtroom."130 
On March 10th, 1952, one may suspect that Judge Medina's look was 
equally sober, but less satisfied. On that day the Supreme Court upheld 
his contempt sentences.131 The five majority Justices saw in the issue 
which had survived the lower court proceedings only a narrow procedural 
question which they disposed of without passing on the Judge's own con-
duct. The three minority Justices, seeing in the case a necessity to consid-
er that conduct, proceeded to give Judge Medina what may well be the 
most severe scolding for judicial misbehavior ever given a lower federal 
judge by a bloc of Supreme Court Justices. The rebuke was all the more 
striking because its most comprehensive statement was by Justice Frank-
furter, noted for his almost extreme courtesy to the lower federal bench. 
The eleven month trial had been remarkable throughout. It came to 
Judge Medina at a time when, after a brilliant career as a teacher, a court-
room lawyer, and as the outstanding cram-course lecturer in the country, 
he was still a most inexperienced judge. His professional career had seen 
the growth of an irrepressible oral ability which he had tamed only with-
in the confines of lecturer and advocate. The judicial art of listening was 
foreign to him, and as the long trial progressed, it proved to be unavail-
able. The record fully supports the conclusion of Justice Frankfurter that 
Judge Medina allowed his courtroom to become "an undisciplined debat-
ing society .... Too often counsel were encouraged to vie with the court 
in dialectic, in repartee and banter, in talk so copious as inevitably to 
128 328 u.s. 373 (1946). 129 339 u.s. 629 (1950). 
no 27 Life, No. 17, at 31 (Oct. 24, 1949). 
131 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
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arrest the momentum of the trial and to weaken the restraints of respect 
that a judge should engender,in lawyers .... He indulged them, some-
times resignedly, sometimes playfully, in lengthy speeches ... inconti-
nent wrangles between court and counsel."132 
The proceedings in this most difficult case were further complicated by 
the Judge's almost morbid preoccupation with his physical well-being.133 
As Justice Frankfurter said, "His self-concern pervades the record." It 
was further complicated by a sense of religious mission which might to 
some equally religious men seem blasphemous. 
In an article on his religious experience in relation to contempt of 
court, 134 the Judge described the divine guidance which came to him when 
he was "singled out to uphold American justice in an evil crisis." He 
quickly gained a "solemn feeling" that his courtroom rulings were "part 
of a universal fabric, part and parcel of moral law, divine in origin." In 
a crisis, "Someone else had showed me what to do." 
This personal sense of divine guidance gave the judge an assurance and 
strength adequate to surmount the perils of his martyrdom. In one crisis 
of the trial, weary, he lay down and "asked God to take charge of things 
and that His will be done .... That brief period of communion with my 
Maker saved my life and saved the trial." At times as he smote those who 
strove against him, one senses that the power of an Avenging Angel 
gripped his arm. A,s he puts it, when he gave his first contempt sentence 
during the trial, "If ever a man felt the presence of Someone else beside 
him, strengthening his will and giving him aid and comfort, it was I on 
that day." 
The legal issues which survived this manifestation of the divine will did 
not include the question of whether the lawyers were, in fact, in contempt. 
There is scarceJy room for doubt that they were, some of them grossly so. 
Judge Charles Clark, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, conceded that 
their conduct was "abominable."135 None of the Supreme Court attempted 
to defend their total behavior, which, taken by itself, the record shows to 
have been indefensible. The large factual issue remaining was whether 
that conduct could be viewed by itself, or whether counsel's behavior was 
132 Ibid., at 38. The Frankfurter opinion from which various quotes are taken is ibid., at 
23-42, and the Appendix is ibid., at 42-89. 
133 See, e.g., Alexander, Ordeal of Judge Medina, 223 Sat. Evening Post 17 (Aug. 12, 1950); 
Daniel, Judge Medina 232-33 (1952). 
134 Medina, Someone Else on the Bench, 59 Reader's Digest 16 (August, 1951). 
13S Judge Clark continues: ''Yet such natural emotional reaction does not of itself prove that 
they should be imprisoned without a hearing weeks or months after the events." {Emphasis 
added.) 182 F. 2d 416, 463 (C.A. 2d, 1950). 
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an inevitable response to judicial goading. As stated succinctly by Justice 
Douglas, the issue was "whether members of the bar conspired to drive a 
judge from the bench or whether the judge used the authority of the bench 
to whipsaw the lawyers, to taunt and tempt them, and to create for him-
self the role of the persecuted.11136 
That factual issue permeated these legal questions: 
First, whether Federal Criminal Rule 42 required Judge Medina either 
to give the attorneys a hearing himself or to refer the contempt matter to 
another judge for hearing and sentencing. 
Second, whether the conduct of Judge Medina exhibited such extreme 
bias and eccentricity that as a matter of sound supervision of the federal 
courts, the sentences should not be allowed to stand. 
Third, whether the blending of a general conspiracy charge against the 
lawyers by Judge Medina with his specific charges of misdeeds required a 
reversal. 
To dispose of the third question first, Judge Medina, as he has said off 
the record, early came to the conclusion that the Communists were trying 
"to wear me down until I lost my self control and occasioned a mistrial."137 
When, at the end of the trial, therefore, Judge Medina handed down his 
sentences, he did so on forty counts. The last thirty-nine were specific mis-
deeds occurring in the courtroom. The first was a general conspiracy 
charge of systematic disruption of the trial. The whole was prefaced by a 
statement in which he said that he would have been inclined to overlook 
many of the misdeeds except that he found there had been "an agreement 
between these defendants, deliberately entered into in a cold and calcu-
lating manner" to make th.e trial impossible, force a mistrial, and ruin 
the Judge's health.138 
If such an agreement existed, it was of course contemptuous. But under 
Rule 42(a),t39 a judge may give a summary contempt sentence only for 
contempt which he "saw or heard," which is "committed in the actual 
presence of the court." All out of court contempt is subjectto Rule42(b) 
which requires, at a minimum, notice and hearing, and may require trans-
fer to another judge. In this case the conspiracy, assuming as may well be 
true that it existed, obviously occurred out of court. Hence the Court of 
Appeals (Judge Frank on this issue joining Judge Clark who dissented on 
the whole case) reversed on the conspiracy count, and that conclusion was 
not reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
us 343 U.S. 1, 89 (1952). 137 Reader's Digest, op. cit. supra note 134. 
138 182 F. 2d 416, 430 (C.A. 2d, 1950). The contempt certificate is set out ibid., at 430-53. 
uv Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42(a) and rules following. 
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Nonetheless the Court of Appeals Oudge Clark dissenting as to this) 
held that since the sentences on all counts were concurrent, the reversal 
on the conspiracy count was immaterial. The Supreme Court affirmed this 
ruling. This, while undoubtedly permissible under the technical rule as to 
concurrent sentences,140 was on the facts most unjust since, by his own 
statement, the severity of Judge Medina's sentences was obviously the 
product of his decision on the v~ry point on which he was overruled. This 
is particularly apparent in the case of McCabe, who received a thirty day 
sentence. Apart from the conspiracy, if any, there were five counts against 
McCabe for misdeeds in an eleven month trial. While they undoubtedly 
show contempt, a severe rebuke or a small money fine would have been 
more than adequate punishment.141 
Turning to the issue of the interpretation of Rule 42(a), the only matter 
considered by the majority, the question is narrow. Rule 42(a) permits 
summary punishment, without charge, notice, or hearing, by the judge 
against whom the contempt is committed, if it is committed in open court. 
Rule 42(b) requires notice and hearing for all other contempts and, where 
the contempt involves "disrespect to or criticism of a judge," requires that 
another judge shall hear the case. 
Conceivably contempt in open court might be punished (a) by the 
judge then and there, at the moment of contempt, announcing the pun-
ishment and immediately enforcing it; (b) by the judge postponing the 
announcement for a short period of calm and contemplation, and then en-
forcing it; (c) by the judge either immediately or soon after the episode 
announcing guilt, but suspending either the sentence or its enforcement 
until the end of trial; or (d) by the judge waiting until the end of trial both 
uo The cases are collected by Judge Frank, 182 F. 2d 416, 456 n. 6 (C.A. 2d, 1950). 
tu The case against McCabe, as set out by Judge Medina in the contempt certificate, 182 
F. 2d at 434, 435, 436, 444-45 is this: (1) On February 4, 1949, McCabe uttered a sentence 
which included the phrase that something the Judge had said "may very well be addressed to 
some one outside the courtroom." (2) On the same day, some of the lawyers persisted overly in 
arguing a point. The sole allusion to McCabe in this count is that "The Court told Mr. McCabe 
that argument was unnecessary." Mr. McCabe apparently thereupon desisted, though two of 
the other lawyers did not. (3) On January 17th, 1949, the Court observed that counsel were 
conducting the case in a way "he never thought he would see in a court of justice." Up to this 
point, so far as the citation shows, McCabe had not been involved; but McCabe then said 
"in a sarcastic tone," "I will agree, your Honor, on that last point; the way this case has been 
conducted is one which I certainly hoped that I would never see in a court of justice." The 
Court responded, ''You mean the way it has been conducted by me, I take it." McCabe: "I 
mean that exactly." (4) On February 18th, 1949, McCabe [in his one apparently premeditated 
contempt; JPF) asserted that the Judge was timing his statements from the bench to make 
the newspapers. (5) On June 3d, some of the defendants (not McCabe) were disorderly. None 
of the lawyers, including McCabe "made any attempt to assist the Court in restoring order." 
All of McCabe's charged acts of contempt except the completely negative No. 5 were at 
least six months before sentence. 
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to announce guilt (though making threats occasionally) and to assess and 
enforce the penalty. In the West Coast Communist cases, the judges used 
devices (b) and (c).142 Judge Medina used (d). 
Thus in this case, the actual determination of guilt and the sentence 
came months after the episodes which occasioned them. This, claimed the 
lawyers, was not "summary punishment," the only kind of punishment 
permitted by Rule 42(a), and therefore the case must fall under Rule 
42(b). The Supreme Court's majority held, to the contrary, that the trial 
judge "if he believes the exigencies of the trial require" may "defer judg-
ment until its completion." Justice Frankfurter's dissenting position in 
essence was that, since immediate punishment obviously was not neces-
sary to the completion of the trial, which finished without it, and since the 
contempts were of a sort dominantly personal to Judge Medina, the case 
should be tried by another judge under Rule 42(b). 
This leaves the question of whether, in fact, Judge Medina's conduct of 
the trial was such that the parties and the Judge were, if one may borrow a 
conception from tort law, in pari delicto. On this the majority expressed 
no opinion. Justice Black found that Judge Medina showed "such bitter 
hostility to the lawyers that the accuser should be held disqualified to try 
them."143 In one instance he found that "Candor compels me to say that 
in this episode the decorum and dignity of the lawyer who had just been 
sent to prison loses nothing by comparison with" that of the Judge. Jus-
tices Douglas and Frankfurter have been quoted above. But the crowning 
evidence of the Judge's own responsibility is an extensive appendix to 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion consisting of quotations from the record 
which will leave most lawyer readers with an uncomfortable, embarrassed 
sense that the endless, superfluous talk which stretched out the Commu-
nist case was by no means all from the front of the Bench.144 
(g) Criminal Procedure. About ten per cent of the cases of the Term in-
volved forced confessions, the right to counsel, and searches and seizures. 
The principal accomplishment of the year in these areas was Jemtings 
1c The cases are discussed by Justice Frankfurter at 343 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1952). 
m Ibid., at 15, 17. Justice Black also discussed the constitutional validity of contempt 
sentences without jury trial. 
mIt is interesting to note that the current New York and Los Angeles Communist trials 
are proceeding with smooth efficiency and are running into none of the snags that blocked the 
first case. This may be in part because Judge Medina blazed the way, in part because more dis-
creet counsel are involved in the present cases. However, observers who were in the courtroom 
in the first case, and who have first-hand information about the current cases, report that the 
principal difference is in the orderly, unobtrusive, efficient and quiet way Judge Dimock (New 
York) and Judge Mathes (Los Angeles) run their courtrooms, 
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v. Illinois/ 45 which seems, if optimism may be permitted where hope has 
so often been blighted before, to put an end to the Illinois post-conviction 
procedural tangle. Under familiar principles, prisoners in Illinois as in all 
other state penitentiaries are entitled to challenge their convictions col-
laterally if they were denied constitutional rights at their original trials, 
at least in the absence of waiver. Under equally familiar principles, they 
must exhaust the state remedy of collateral attack before they may have 
recourse to the federal district court. 
For almost ten years the Supreme Court has been mired in an impos-
sible effort to discover what the Illinois state remedy was, so that it might 
be known whether it had been exhausted. Finally, under the goading of 
the sizzling opinion of Justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen,146 in which he 
denounced the Illinois procedure as a series of blind alleys, and under the 
pressures of the bar, the press, and the law schools147 of the state, Illinois 
passed a post-conviction hearing act which promised to give a plain, 
speedy, and adequate state remedy. Unfortunately, the state courts 
seemed in the prospect of giving that remedial statute an extremely nar-
row interpretation which would have re-created the very situation it was 
intended to remedy.148 
The matter came to a head this year in the Jennings case. Here, in a 
group of three cases, each petitioner, now an inmate of an Illinois peniten-
tiary, claimed to have been imprisoned on a forced confession. Each raised 
the issue that he had been unable to appeal his original conviction because 
he was a pauper, and each :filed a collateral petition for review under the 
Illinois post-conviction hearing act. The trial courts denied the petitions of 
each without consideration of the merits of their claims. In each, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, as it had in twenty-five cases preceding this which 
had reached the United States Supreme Court, entered form orders dis-
missing the appeals as insubstantial. 
Chief Justice Vinson, in the reversing opinion, conceded that a viola-
tion of constitutional rights might, under appropriate circumstances, be 
waived by failure to appeal an original conviction; but he held that a 
right of appeal conditioned upon the possession of money which the 
petitioners did not have amounted to no right of appeal at all. Since the 
us 342 u.s. 104 (1951). 
146 332 U.S. 561 (1947); see also the significant opinion of the Chief Justice in this series, 
Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). 
147 E.g. Katz, An Open Letter to the Attorney General of illinois, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 251 
(1948). 
ua Smith-Hurd TIL Ann. Stat. (1951), c. 38, Supp. p. 235. 
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Illinois Attorney General asserted that the post-conviction hearing act 
was not appropriate for raising petitioners' questions, there appeared to 
be no state remedy. He thereupon remanded the case with instructions 
in the alternative. Either the state Supreme Court was to specify exactly 
how petitioners' claims could be raised under the Illinois Statute, or 
"petitioners may proceed without more in the United States District 
Court." 
That did it. On remand, the Dlinois Supreme Court :filed a comprehen-
sive opinion interpreting the state act to give a model review procedure.149 
If Illinois sticks to the blueprint laid down in this opinion, its post-convic-
tion procedures will have moved from about the worst to as good as the 
best in the country. Whether they will work out that way remains to be 
seen. 
In the field of forced confessions, the Court unanimously in result, 
though by different routes, held that the police could not use a stomach 
pump to make a defendant disgorge evidence. Justice Frankfurter, for the 
majority, reached the result because stomach pumping shocked his con-
science and therefore denied due process. Justices Black and Douglas, 
without consulting their consciences, thought it enough that such evidence 
was self-incriminatory.l50 
(h) Summary of Civil Rights Positions. A summary of the positions of 
the Justices in the divided civil rights cases follows. As always, such data 
must be read with the greatest care, for they may be misleading. This 
year, for example, one of the most important civil rights cases, that con-
cerning movie censorship, was unanimous and therefore is not included 
here. Again, no numerical presentation can make allowance for intensity, 
or extremes of view. For example Justice Jackson's lone desire to overrule 
all the cases which have declared that the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
the First Amendment a specific limitation on the states151 is obviously 
more significant than some individual vote on the facts of a particular con-
fession case. 
149 People v. Jennings, 411 Til. 21, 102 N.E. 2d 824 (1952). 
150 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The various opinions discuss the "conscience 
test." Another forced confession case was Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which 
the confession was held not forced. Defendant, who had committed a particularly horrible 
murder of a small child, appears to have had the minimum amount of roughing up that can 
be expected from any police short of demi-gods. In Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), 
the Court dealt with a most unusual situation in which the confession was forced, if at all, by 
one state, and the conviction occurred in another. 
Miscellaneous search and seizure cases were United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); 
the On Lee case, discussed at length above in connection with privacy; and Stefanelli v. 
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). 
1n Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952). 
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When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless 
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him pre-
ponderantly in one column or the other, then the :figures contain a clue as 
to his basic attitudes about civil rights. For example, Justice Minton is the 
first Justice in the six years that these tables have been ac;cumulated to 
vote against the claimed right in every divided case in which he partici-
pated. At a minimum, one may deduce from this that Justice Minton 
places civil rights lower than many other values on his own scale. 
TABLE 1 










IN SUPPORT OP CLAI!dED RIGHT IN DENIAL OF CLAnmD RIGHT 
Percentage 
1951 1946-50 1946-51 of Total 1951 1946-50 
3 13 16 15 17 74 
18 66 84 79 2 21 
3 14 17 16 17 74 
14 43 57 53 5 45 
16 63 79 83 4 12 
7 2"3 30 28 13 63 
7 20 27 25 13 68 
5 4 9 26 12 14 
0 5 5 11 16 26 
TABLE 2 
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There were twenty divided civil rights cases at the 1951 term.152 Dis-
qualifications result in some Justices having less than that number. The 
152 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Brotherhood R.R. Trainmen v. 
Howard, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952); Beauharnais v. TI!inois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Boyce Motor 
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951), 
treated as a divided case on the McNabb point; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); 
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Jennings v. TI!inois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); Keenan 
v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951); OnLeev. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952); Leland v. Oregon, 
72 S. Ct. 1002 (1952); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 
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same data, presented separately for the 1949-51 terms only, makes clearer 
the relationship of Justices Clark and Minton to the rest of .the Court. 
IV. LAWYER'S LAW 
(a) Jurisdiction, procedure, and related subjects. Jurisdictional case of the 
year and a matter of major importance was Madsen v. Kinsella,l53 uphold-
ing the validity of the American court system in Germany. 
The case arose when Yvette J. Madsen, an American citizen, murdered 
her husband, an American Airforce Lieutenant, near Frankfort. After her 
arrest by military police, if she was to be tried by any American court in 
Germany at all, the alternatives were a court martial or a "United States 
Court of the Allied High Commission." She was tried by the latter, a 
court with American civilian judges which applied German law. The pro-
cedure of such courts is a peculiar merger of military and civil practice, 
and accords to the defendant some but not all of the constitutional guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights. For example, there is no jury: Convicted in this 
court, she appealed to a higher Commission Court and upon affirmance of 
her conviction was imprisoned in a United States prison in West Vir-
ginia.l54 
The principal questions in the case, covered in a handsome opinion by 
Justice Burton, were: First, whether as between courts martial and the 
Commission courts, the latter had jurisdiction to try the case; second, 
whether, assuming that such Commission courts might under some cir-
cumstances be appropriate, they retained jurisdiction after the occupation 
passed to civil authorities; and third, whether such a system of courts 
could be established by Presidential edict, as these were, without statu-
tory basis. There was also a trifling question as to whether, assuming the 
validity of the court system, the particular offense and defendant were 
within its jurisdiction. It was readily shown that they were. 
The real problem in the case lies in the fact that post-World War II oc-
cupations by American troops were a new phenomenon in American ex-
343 U.S. 451 (1952); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); United States v. Spector, 343 
U.S. 169 (1952); ~tefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.117 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 
(1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Justice Jackson's vote in the Beauharnais case 
is treated as against the claimed right, since it is so on the dominant matter under discussion. 
In addition, the following civil rights cases were (in result) unanimous: Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Frisbie v. Collins, 343 U.S. 519 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
153 343 u.s. 341 (1952). 
1u As a result there was no problem of whether any American court had jurisdiction to re-
view a conviction abroad, as in Ahrens v. Clark, 333 U.S. 826 (1947), and Eisentrager v. John-
son, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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perience, and the precedents could not be expected to have a clean fit. Oc-
cupation is of course not new; the Civil and Spanish American War ex-
periences were in point. But never before had a vast system of mixed civil 
and military courts been established for so many people for so long a time. 
Such genius as there is to this new system was in the effort to make it 
"Civilian" and as indigenous to German legal tradition as possible. The 
danger was that this very effort to make the system more palatable might 
overthrow it.155 
Here, Mrs. Madsen, on the rational theory that she could not do 
worse than be convicted again, staked her case on the claim that she 
should have been tried by a genuine court martial. The government con-
tended that the occupation courts were in the nature of military commis-
sions and that the jurisdiction of such commissions was concurrent with 
courts martial. 
Under the Articles of War, a court martial would have had jurisdiction 
to try Mrs. Madsen. But under Article 15, their jurisdiction is explicitly 
made concurrent with that of "military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals" if the offenders or offenses "by the law of war 
may be lawfully triable by such military" tribunals. 
This brings the case to its hard point, and here the argument is a little 
thin, as innovation is wont to be. To come within the exception of Article 
15, the Commission courts must be metamorphosed into "military com-
missions ... or other military tribunals." This takes doing, particularly 
since Mrs. Madsen's offense occurred after the Occupation Statute of 1949 
when Germany was under control of a civilian High Commissioner report-
ing to the State Department, the judges were all civilians, and even the 
word "military" had been carefully stripped from the name of the tribu-
nal. Assuming, arguendo, that such a phenomenon as a "nonmilitary" 
American court can exist in any occupied territory, it is hard to imagine 
how any could be less military than this. 
Nonetheless the Court's practical alternatives were either to approve 
the system used or upset every conviction for years and compel the use of 
a hierarchy of genuinely military tribunals. Faced with that alternative, 
Justice Burton turned the occupation courts into courts "in the nature of 
military commissions" by sheer ipse dixit. True, the government was no 
longer military, but "it was a government prescribed by an occupying 
:ws For description, bibliography and extended discussion of the constitutional problems 
involved, see Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 Stan-
ford L. Rev, 587, particularly, 616-45 (1949). The discussion there is so full that the text above 
will consider only the statutory point. ' 
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power and it depended upon the continuing military occupancy of the 
territory.mss There is literally no reasoning at all but the sentence quoted 
to explain just why these courts were in the nature of military commis-
sions. 
This of course assumes the other point in issue, whether the President 
had power to create such courts. He obviously has the power to create mil-
itary commissions, and if these are military commissions, then it follows 
automatically that his power is adequate to establish them. But Justice 
Burton was careful to protect the power of Congress to take the matter 
over: "The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this uncharted 
area does not imply its lack of power to legislate." 
Justice Black dissented: "I think that if American citizens in present-
day Germany are to be tried by the American government, they should be 
tried under laws passed by Congress and in courts created by Congress 
under its constitutional authority."l57 
While this is essentially decision by brute force rather than by reason 
or precedent, such is the nature of seminal decisions. So were the decisions 
bringing corporations within the protecti<;m of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or establishing substantive due process, or extending the Fourteenth 
Amendment to cover freedom of speech.158 There would have been no 
profit in holding that the democratic tradition required the use of a less 
democratic court system in Germany than in fact was used, and this is the 
only practical choice if one were to say that only genuine courts martial 
could try these cases. 
Two domestic jurisdictional decisions may have some significance. In 
Doremzes v. Board of Education/59 petitioners, who were respectively the 
parents of a school child and taxpayers, brought suit in a New Jersey state 
court to invalidate the New Jersey statute under which school begins with 
the reading of five verses of the Old Testament. The New Jersey courts, 
though dubious, accepted the standing of petitioners to raise the question. 
The Supreme Court directed argument on the question of jurisdiction, its 
attitude being reflected by Justice Jackson in an observation during oral 
argument, "We won't have anything but religious questions, if we don't 
m Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 357 (1952). 
JS7 Ibid., at 372. 
ISS The cases are Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (one 
sentence on the critical point and no opinion at all); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (be-
ginning utility rate review with three paragraphs of assumptions); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925) (one sentence on the critical point). 
JSV 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
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watch out." Meanwhile the claim of the parent became moot since the 
child graduated from the school system; and the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Jackson, held that it could not review the matter for want of a 
case or controversy since the taxpayer's suit was nota "good faith pocket-
book action." 
Under Massachusetts v. Mellon/60 a federal law could not be challenged 
on a taxpayer's suit; but that case clearly reserved the power of the Su-
preme Court to review cases involving a state statute and a state general 
taxpayer arising from those states which have an opposite rule. So far as 
is known, Doremus is the first case in which a taxpayer's action treated as 
giving rise to a justifiable controversy for state purposes has been found 
inadequate for federal purposes. The Massachusetts v. Mellon rule has 
worked perfectly satisfactorily both in its barring of federal and its per-
mitting of state taxpayer suits, and there is no good reason to limit it. 
However the Doremus case can perhaps be taken as a sport, peculiar to 
its facts. The New Jersey court was so obviously anxious to uphold its law 
that it virtually waived the jurisdictional defense in so many words, and 
almost overtly gave a purely advisory opinion. In the New York release 
time case, the Court distinguished Doremus because "appellants here are 
parents of children currently attending schools subject to the released 
time program," with no discussion at all of financial interests.161 This sug-
gests that if the New Jersey case had been brought by a parent whose 
child would stay in the school system long enough to outlast the litigation, 
the identical issue could thus be raised. 
Further evidence that Doremus was not intended to be a substantial 
jurisdictional innovation is found in the Adler case/62 upholding New 
York's Feinberg Law and decided on the same day as Doremus. The Adler 
case was a declaratory judgment proceeding, the plaintiffs surviving to the 
Supreme Court being eight municipal taxpayers suing to enjoin waste of 
funds by an unconstitutional program. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting 
alone on this point, claimed Dorenms as authority and asserted that the 
Adler case too was not a "pocketbook action" and had no real relation to 
New York city taxes. Adler was a standard taxpayer's suit, the interest 
of the taxpayer in fact being almost always negligible. The majority did 
not bother to answer the Frankfurter dissent, assuming its jurisdiction 
without discussion. So long as typical parents cases, like the release time 
160 262 u.s. 447 (1923). 
161 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 n. 6 (1952). 
162 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 4S5 (1952). 
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case, and typical taxpayers cases, like Adler, may be brought, Doremus 
does not substantially cut down traditional jurisdiction. 
The one serious jurisdictional innovation of the year, so serious if 
taken at face value that the impulse is strong to suppose that not so much 
was intended, is Stembridge v. Georgia.163 The facts are complex and pecu-
liar. Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in a Georgia trial court, his 
conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate court (the Court of Ap-
peals) and certiorari was denied by the state Supreme Court. Subsequent-
ly petitioner filed a motion for new trial in the trial court, which was de-
nied. This denial was affirmed by the intermediate court. Petitioner then, 
for the first time, in a motion for rehearing in the intermediate court 
raised federal constitutional objections to his conviction. This motiQn was 
denied on July 17, 1951. On September 12, 1951, the state Supreme Court 
denied certiorari. · 
On October 22, 1951, petitioner obtained from the intermediate court 
an amendment of the record which said in so many words, "this court con-
sidered the constitutional question [petitioner] raised and decided it 
against the contentions of the" petitioner. Petitioner did not seek a similar 
statement from the Supreme Court of Georgia." 
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Minton, 
thereupon dismissed the petition on the ground that the state decision 
miglzt have rested on adequate state grounds. The discussion, after the 
statement of facts, is only a half dozen sentences, beginning "It is appar-
ent from the record that the Supreme Court of Georgia took no action 
upon the question of federal constitutional rights raised for the first time 
on the motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals.m64 
But this could not possibly be "apparent" from the record. All that is 
in the record from the Supreme Court of Georgia is two denials of certi-
orari. The second was a denial after decision by the intermediate court 
which, by its own statement, did pass on the federal question. The most 
that could possibly be "apparent" from the record is that the state Su-
preme Court either might or might not have done the-same thing. 
True, as Justice Minton says, normal Georgia practice requires that 
constitutional questions first be raised at the trial level, and therefore one 
may speculate that the state Supreme Court did not pass on the question. 
But this is pure speculation, for the same rule is equally applicable to the 
intermediate court, and it did pass on the federal question. 
Then comes the next step in the argument. "Where the highest court 
163 343 u.s. 541 (1952). 
m Ibid., at 547. 
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of the state delivers no opinion and it appears that' the judgment might 
have rested upon a nonfederal ground, this Court will not take jurisdiction 
to review the judgment .... We are without jurisdiction when the ques-
tion of the existence of an adequate state ground is debatable.mss 
But these propositions by no means require, or even indicate, dismissal 
of a petition. Standard operating procedure when it is- debatable whether 
a decision rests on an adequate state ground is to return it to the state 
court to :find out. In the Jenn_ings case/66 discussed above, involving the 
Illinois post-conviction procedures, the court did exactly that at this very 
term after discussion of the merits. In Dixon v. Dztjfy,16i a case also at this 
term and which also raised questions of the validity of criminal procedure, · 
there was no opinion by the state Supreme Court. The order of the United 
States Supreme Court read, "continued for such period as will enable 
counsel for petitioner to secure a determination froin the Supreme Court 
of California as to whether the judgment herein was intended to rest on 
an adequate independent ground." In Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada 
Petrol. Corp.,l68 also at this term, the case was :first continued to permit 
determination of whether the decision below was on an adequate state 
ground, and was subsequently disposed of after the information had been 
obtained. 
Justices Black, Frapkfurter, and Burton dissented from the dismissal in 
the Stembridge case. Justice Reed went along with the Court, though with 
apparent qualms on the jurisdictional point. The Stembridge practice of 
dismissing the petition where the existence of a federal question is "de-
batable" cannot be squared with the Jennings, Dixon, and Palmer Oil 
practice of remanding or continuing the case for determination of that 
very point. If the Stembridge practice becomes general, it will serve as an 
easy device for state courts to evade Supreme Comt review by abstaining 
from writing opinions. It is always easy to dream up some adequate state 
ground the existence of which is "debatable." 
(b) Full faith and credit. The conflicts cases of the year moved on readily 
predictable lines. One divorce case holds the now familiar ground that 
State A may set aside a divorce obtained in State B only on a showing that 
the parties had not been served or had not participated in the proceedings 
in State B.169 A second divorce case, with an unusually intricate fact situ-
1153 Ibid., at 547-48. (Emphasis added.) 
1116 Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951). 
167 342 u.s. 33, 34 {1951). 
18 342 U.S. 35 (1951). m Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). 
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ation, was neatly dispatched by Justice Reed.170 In it, plaintiff got an 
illinois divorce from defendant, including an alimony obligation by de-
fendant "for so long as plaintiff shall remain unmarried." Plaintiff did re-
marry, but this marriage was later validly annulled in New York on the 
ground that her second spouse was already married. Plaintiff thereupon 
claimed alimony under the original decree as though she had "remained 
unmarried." The Court held that while the New York annullment must 
be given full faith and credit everywhere, it did not control "separable 
legal rights." Therefore the alimony provision was to be construed in the 
light of whether under Illinois law an annulled marriage does or does not 
amount to a remarriage. 
V. THE INsTITUTION_ AND ITs JusTICEs 
The Work of the Institution 
Once again, the total volume of the Court's work was light. This year 
the number of cases was 89,171 as compared with 88 for 1950, 94 for 1949, 
122 for 1948, and 119 for 1947. Before World War II, the docket usually 
ran to 200 and more cases a year. So light a total load permitted extended 
recesses during the term. 
As last year, this decline of the docket was a product both of the rigidi-
ty of the grant of certiorari and of the decline of cases worth the Court's 
deciding. The studies by Professor Harper and his collaborators go into 
the subject so thoroughly that it is unnecessary to cover the same ground 
here.172 Suffice it to restate the conclusion of extensive demonstration in 
previous articles, that the Court, in cutting its work-load down far below 
the level it can be expected to handle, is not serving the purpose of the 
Act of 1925 giving it discretionary jurisdiction. An unfortunate example 
is the Dollar Steamship litigation, in which the government and the pri-
vate parties involved finally split a financial burden which should have 
fallen on either one or the other because the Supreme Court persistently 
refused to decide the legal points involved.173 Another is Remingtc1t v. 
no Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952). 
171 On the uniform counting method used in these articles, see 1950 Term article, 19 Univ. 
Chi. L. Rev. 165, 216 n. 215. 
172 Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An 
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1950); Harper and Etherington, What the 
Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1950 Term, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354 (1951). 
m For discussion, see 1950 Term article, op. cit. supra note 171, at 235. For continuation of 
the Court's inaction, see Land v. Dollar, 72 S. Ct. 1069 (1952). The parties finally got tired 
and settled after the Court adjourned for the summer, see N.Y. Times§ 2, p. 33, col. 5 Uune 13, 
1952); 39 Newsweek, No. 35, at 70 Uune 23, 1952). 
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United States,174 where the Court, over two dissents, declined to review the 
substantial procedural question of whether a grand jury indictment is 
valid when the foreman of the grand jury is engaged in a financial venture 
with the chief witness for the government and the profits depend material-
ly on the outcome of the very case before the grand jury. 
The declining certiorari jurisdiction can not be accounted for on the 
ground of the extraordinary difficulty or importance of what is taken. As 
a rough estimate, about twenty-five of the cases of the Term were of some 
substantial importance, and another twenty-five were of some difficulty. 
Several of the cases taken can only be described as piddling. Examples are 
Desper v. Sta1'11ed Rock Ferry Co.,175 a case unique on its facts, in which the 
issue is whether a particular workman, doing unusual work on the lliinois 
River, was a "seaman" and hence covered by the Jones Act; Bmner v. 
United States,176 deciding whether a War Department civilian :fire fighter 
was an "employee" or an "officer" of the United States for Tucker Act 
purposes; United States v. Kelly,171 interpreting a long since obsolete pay 
agreement covering holiday work at the Government Printing Office; and 
Gardner v. Panama R. Co.,178 a tort case involving a unique problem in 
laches and liability which could not arise again because of change of stat-
utes. There may be some good reason why cases such as these should be 
heard, but their existence negates any suggestion that the Court is reserv-
ing its energy solely for important public questions. 
A related matter is the operation of the so-called Rule of Four. The Act 
of 1925179 was passed on the assurance to Congress by the Court's repre-
sentatives that certiorari would be granted when four, not :five, Justices 
voted for it. As has been pointed out in this series of articles before, that 
promise would be nullified if, after four Justices voted to grant the peti-
tion, the remainder thereupon used their majority power to dismiss the 
petition without deciding the case. 
Justice Frankfurter continued this year to attempt to persuade his 
brethren to adopt this dismissal practice. In United States v. Slzannon,180 
the Court granted certiorari and decided the case on its merits. Justice 
Frankfurter declined to vote either way on the merits, arguing that the 
petition should be dismissed. Justice Douglas, conceding that petitions 
might be dismissed if improvidently granted, thought this privilege should 
be restricted to those who have voted to grant the writ. Ee alluded to the 
m 342 U.S. 895 (1951). 
175 342 u.s. 187 (1952). 
176 343 u.s. 112 (1952). 
177 342 u.s. 193 (1952). 
178 342 u.s. 29 {1951). 
179 43 Stat. 938 {1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 38 (1950). 
180 342 u.s. 288 (1952). 
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Rule of Four, saying "If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, 
then the four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity 
of the four-vote rule or certiorari would then be impaired."181 The force of 
this objection was apparent in United States v. Jordan.182 There, four Jus-
tices presumably having voted to grant certiorari, the Court heard argu-
ment and split four to four on the merits, Justice Frankfurter declining to 
express any view since he thought the writ should be dismissed. Despite 
the wish of four, the Court was thus rendered incapable of disposing of the 
case except by affirming with an equally divided Court. 
As for other details of its business management, the Court continued to 
be extremely strict in barring the filing of briefs amicus.183 Its rule seems 
a peculiar one, since if the Court is going to reserve its energies for public 
business of high seriousness, it might as well know what various segments 
of the public think about the matters at hand. 
Oral arguments before the Court continued, as they have for many 
years past, to be less formal presentations of argument by counsel than 
running discussion between the Bench and counsel. For example in the 
American National Insurance case, with an hour on each side, the Court 
interpolated 153 questions or observations during the argument of govern-
ment counsel, and 84 during the argument of private counsel. Government 
counsel uttered more than six consecutive sentences without interruption 
only four times after his brief opening. The numerical distribution of the 
237 interpolations during the 120 minutes of the two arguments was as 
follows: The Chief Justice, 12; Justice Black, 30; Justice Reed, 69; Jus-
tice Frankfurter, 93; Justice Jackson, 26; Justice Burton, 7; and Justices 
Douglas, Clark, and Minton none.184 
The distribution of majoritr opinions among the Justices is shown in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS 
Vmson......... 9 Jackson. . . . . . . . 9 
Black .......... 11 Burton......... 7 
Reed. . . . . . . . . . 7 Clark. . . . . . . . . . 9 
Frankfurter..... 9 Minton ........ 10 
Douglas ........ 11 Per curiam..... 7 
181 Ibid., at 298. 182 342 u.s. 911 (1952). 
183 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952), Justices Black and Frankfurter objecting 
to the operation of the amicus rule. 
184 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). In Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 
(1952), the total number of judicial interpolations was 166, divided as follows: The Chief 
Justice, 58; Justice Reed, 52; Justice Jacks:>n, 27; Justice Burton, 5; Justice Clark, 12; Justice 
Minton, 12; Justice Douglas, none; and Justices Black and Frankfurter not participating. 
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The extent to which the views of particular Justices have prevailed can 
best be measured by concentrating on the most important of the decisions, 
and for this purpose I have chosen, as objectively as possible on so subjec-
tive a matter, the two groups of cases which seem to me to have the most 
important consequences to society. The :first group consists of the seven 
cases which seem the most significant of the year.185 The second group of 
twenty cases are definitely less important, but are not routine.186 The data 
in Tables 4 and 5 are taken from these groups. Disqualifications give some 
of the Justices fewer than a total of twenty-seven. 
Justices most often in agreement were Chief Justice Vinson and Jus-
tices Reed and Burton. Had Justices Clark and Minton not been out of 
TABLE 4 
VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES 
:IIIAJORITY VoTEs DISSENTING VOTES 
Imp or- Imp or-
Major tant Total Major tant Total 
Vinson ........... 6 17 23 1 3 4 
Black ............. 2 13 15 5 6 11 
Reed ............. 5 15 20 2 5 7 
Frankfurter ....... 4 13 17 3 3 6 
Douglas .......... 3 12 15 4 8 12 
Jackson ........... 5 17 22 2 3 5 
Burton ........... 6 16 22 1 4 5 
Clark ............. 6 14 20 0 1 1 
Minton ........... 6 10 16 1 5 6 
so many cases, the incidence of agreement between them and the Chief 
Justice would doubtless have been even higher. 
The Work of the Individual Justices 
The Chief Justice does not use his power of assignment, as some of his 
predecessors have done, to take a great share of the big cases. This year, 
185 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 
(1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 
(1952); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306 (1952). (At the time this table was compiled, I did not adequately appreciate the 
significance of Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). I would now include it as a major 
case. It would not materially affect any of the tabular data above, since it was unanimous but 
for Justice Black's dissent; JPF.) 
186 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Brotherhood R.R. Trainmen 
v. Howard, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952); Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951); Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 
(1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); 
Kawakita v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 950 (1952); OnLeev. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952); 
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246 (1952);.Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); United States v. New Wrinkle, 
Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); Pa. Water Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Public Utilities 
Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Rayv. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952); Sacherv. United 
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Stack v.Boyle, 342 U.S.! (1951); Standard Oil v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 
(1952); United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951). 
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of his nine thoroughly workmanlike majority opinions, none involved 
earth shaking topics, and some were on distinctly minor themes. Two, 
Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine,181 involving a claimed suit against a state and 
an issue of federal versus state jurisdiction, and Memphis Steam Laundry 
Cleaner v. Stone,188 invalidating a discriminatory Mississippi license tax, 
are particularly succinct and precise. 
TABLE 5 











Clark............... . . 95 
Minton ................ 73 
TABLE 6 
AGREEMENTS AMONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES 
Frank-
Vinson Black Reed furter Douglas Jackson Burton Clark 
Vmson ..... 13 20 14 10 18 20 19 
Black ....... 13 10 17 19 15 16 11 
Reed ....... 20 10 11 15 19 19 14 
Frankfurter. 14 17 11 15 15 17 12 
Douglas .... 10 19 15 15 15 15 9 
Jackson ..... 18 15 19 15 15 17 15 
Burton ..... 20 16 19 17 15 17 17 
Clark ..•.... 19 11 14 12 9 15 17 










The Chief Justice's handsomest opinion from an artistic standpoint 
(this writer is not completely persuaded on the merits) may well be United 
States v. Hayman.189 It upholds the validity of Section 2255 of the Judicial 
Code/90 detailing the manner in which federal prisoners can collaterally 
attack their convictions. This balanced and comprehensive opinion covers 
the background of the statute, the circumstances of its drafting and its 
application in the instant case. The bill was a product of the Judicial Con-
ference in the period just before the Chief Justice came to preside over 
1!7 342 u.s. 299 (1952). 
188 342 u.s. 389 (1952). 189 342 u.s. 205 (1952). 
180 62 Stat. 967 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (1950). 
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that body, and one catches in the interstices of the opinion a sense of his 
respect for that group. 
The Chief Justice, scarcely an apostle of civil liberty, reaches most lib-
ertarian results in two cases. One was Jennings v. Illinois,191 discussed at 
length above, finally breaking the Illinois procedural log jam in post con-
viction cases. The other was inStackv.Boyle, 192 holding that persons charged 
with political offenses have the same right to bail as anyone else. Regretta-
bly he was unwilling to extend the same principle to aliens facing depor-
tation. Whether in his massive dissent in the steel seizure case it was 
sound strategy to claim so much more than was needed for the Executive 
is arguable; assuming that it was, the dissent constitutes a forceful presen-
tation particularly strong in its marshalling of the facts and in the prose 
of its conclusion. Its oral delivery was unusually effective. 
For Justice Black, this was a year of personal disaster. During it he lost 
his wife, Josephine Foster Black, his constant companion, to whom he was 
devoted. Despite this shattering loss, he concluded his 15th year on the 
Bench with as many majority opinions as any other Justice. 
In point of view, the Justice remained adamantly opposed to there-
pressionist spirit of the times. His outstanding expressions of this resist-
ance were his dissent in the case upholding the Illinois group libellaw,193 
in which he attacks the theory that the fundamentals of human liberty 
are left by the Constitution to be disposed of by rational differences 
among legislators; and his dissent in the alien bail case/94 in which he hits 
with precision, clarity, and force. For the very reason that his stand is so 
straightforward, it is regrettable that the Justice has not yet done, in these 
recent years, any comprehensive statement on freedom of speech. We 
know his results, but not the full details of the logic by which he reaches 
them; even the group libel case does not attempt this. 
Some of his opinions are less satisfying. In Pem~. Water & Power Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm./95 involving a possible conflict between the Commis-
sion's basic statute and the Sherman Act, it is not clear to this reader 
whether the simple act of filing an agreement with the Commission does 
or does not insulate that agreement from the Sherman Act. In Dice 'II. 
Akron, etc. R. Co./96 an FELA case, it is most unclear whether the preced-
ent case involved is overruled or distinguished, and if the latter, how. 
191 342 u.s. 104 (1951). 
192 342 u.s. 1 (1951). 
193 Beauharnais v. Dlinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
194 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
195 343 u.s. 414 (1952). 196 342 u.s. 359 (1952). 
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Brannatt v. Stark,m a dissent, involving the validity of payments to milk 
co-operatives under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, is, most unusually 
for Black, lengthy out of all proportion to its point. On the other hand, the 
terse steel seizure opinion1P8 is, from a structural standpoint, the best pos-
sible way out of a situation in which the Court was so greatly divided; and 
the dissent in the release time case1gg makes orderly mincemeat of the 
majority opinion. The dissent in the lawyers' contempt case200 is a flawless 
presentation of its view. 
One of the outstanding opinions of the year was Justice Reed's Ray f.l. 
Blair, 201 determining principally whether the Twelfth Amendment pre-
cludes Alabama's requirement that candidates for the Electoral College 
pledge in advance to support their party's nominee. The case was decided 
with unusual rapidity because of the imminence of an election there, and 
either the briefs or the Justice's research or both were remarkably compre-
hensive, because the opinion is a very full, though compact, presentation 
of this important matter. In other areas, the Justice wrote two majority 
opinions202 declining to expand in any way his bete noir, the McNabb rule. 
The real mystery about Justice Reed is why, with his broad cultural 
background and his deep personal humanity, he should be so nearly com-
pletely immune to the demands of human liberty. The discussion earlier 
criticizes the merits of Justice Reed's five to four decision in the alien bail 
case,203 under which it becomes routine practice in these United States for 
an underling in the Department of Justice to tear an alien away from his 
family and keep him in jail for years on nothing but a charge. Only our 
Russian adversaries should be expected to treat human beings that way. 
Yet if that result can be sustained under the Constitution, Justice Reed's 
opinion makes the best case for it. 
Justice Frankfurter's big opinion of the year upheld the Illinois group 
libellaw.204 His presentation here is strong. Equally strong, and devastat-
ing in its effect, is the dissent in the lawyers' contempt case.205 
1D7 342 U.S. 451 (1952). 
1DS Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). 
ltD Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
100 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
m 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
102 United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). 
201 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
soc Beauhamais v. Dlinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
205 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
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The Justice's penchant for self-expression continued unabated. In the 
steel seizure case206 he set a new record, with two concurrences (one a brief 
note), and two appendices. The appendices in this case, which collect 
statutes on seizure'and the instances of previous practice, are particularly 
valuable and relevant; one may doubt whether the same may be said for 
the quotations from twenty-three dictionaries appended to his movie 
censorship concurrence.207 
The group libel case and the Justice's opinion in the stomach pump 
forced confession case208 leave the Court thoroughly committed to Justice 
Frankfurter's natural law conception of due process, and to his theory 
that laws restrictive of civil liberty must be upheld if there is any rational 
basis for them. As the Justice puts his own credo in a dissent, we cannot 
"approve legally what we disapprove morally,"209 except for the rational 
basis limitation. The acceptance of.these concepts is a major victory for 
the Justice; as was developed more fully above, he has now regained al-
most all the ground he lost when the first flag salute case was overruled. 
In last year's article, Justice Douglas was described as "the batter who 
couldn't strike out." This year there was one major miss. An admirer can 
only veil his eyes at the release time opinion210 which, quite apart from the 
result, is unfortunate in tone and totally fails even to discuss the critical 
issue of why the petitioners were not allowed to offer proof on their claim 
of coercion. 
The Justice has the art of vigorous rhetorical writing without falling 
into excess, either of verbiage or of vigor; an outstanding example is the 
dissent in the Feinberg Law case.21l. His dissent in the Communist depor-
tation case212 is particularly stimulating in its call for a reconsideration of 
the whole basis of the power of Congress over aliens, and his position is 
cogently supported with legal as well as ethical considerations. Standard 
Oil v. Peck213 is an interesting revision of the law on the taxability of ships 
by the state of their corporate domicile, and his opinions upholding the 
Missouri statute giving time off for voting214 and on the treason of a J apa-
nese-American who renounced his citizenship215 are clear and persuasive. 
200 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). 
207Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 496 (1952). 
20s Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
209 On Lee v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952). 
21° Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
211 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
212 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 213 342 U.S. 382 (1952). 
214 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
215 Kawakita v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 950 (1952). · 
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.  65 1952-1953
1952] THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1951-52 65 
Experience may be making the Justice more critical of excessive admin-
istrative discretion than he might have been years ago. His opinion la-
menting the limitless discretion of government contracting o:fficers216 has 
been quoted above. In an ICC matter, dissenting alone, he said, "Unless 
we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, 
expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster .... 
Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of 
liberty."217 
Two of Justice Jackson's most important opinions this year have been 
criticized above for that cardinal judicial sin, assuming the point in issue. 
In the steel seizure case218 the Justice's opinion slides, in a phrase and a 
footnote, past the vital question of whether the Taft-Hartley Act was 
meant to preclude seizure and devotes pages to a question not argued by 
anybody, namely whether the President can exercise the seizure power in 
defiance of the -express will of Congress. In the retroactive alien deporta-
tion law case,219 a major question is whether it makes any difference that 
the alien may have abandoned his political heresy almost twenty-five 
years before this decision, and eleven years before the relevant statute was 
passed. The Justice expatiates on the comparative hardships of deporta-
tion and military service (a matter not remotely involved), but does not 
discuss the possible legal consequences of genuine redemption by good 
works at all. 
This is, however, the only technical criticism of the Justice's opinions, 
and it is not common to most of them. Even where he is of dubious rele-
vance, his prose is superb and his thought stimulating. This is particularly 
true in the steel seizure case. In the lawyers' contempt case,220 the Justice's 
opinion makes an excellent case for its interpretation of Criminal Rule 42. 
The opinion he most enjoyed writing is probably Morissette v. United 
States,221 a wonderfully comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the 
place of intent in criminal law. 
None of Justice Burton's opinions this year are subject to even picayune 
criticism. His most important is that upholding the occupation court sys-
tem in Germany.222 The discussion above suggests that it slips casually 
216 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951). 
217 New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951). 
218 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). 
219 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
220 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
221 342 u.s. 246 (1952). 
222 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). 
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over its hardest point, but there was no alternative if the necessary result 
was to be reached. His three tax opinions, each of which was of more than 
casual difficulty and breadth, are of high standard in construction, clarity, 
and utilization of relevant material. My personal choice as the best from 
these standpoints, as well as interest, is Lilly 'll. Commissioner,228 on the 
deductibility as business expense of opticians' rebates to eye doctors from 
sales of glasses. His opinion on the Sherman Act violation of the newspa-
per publisher who refused the ads of those who also advertised with a radio 
station in the same area224 treats each of the several points involved with 
due weight; one gets the impression from the fineness of the (relevant) 
factual details that the Justice took special interest in disposing of tbis 
problem from his home area in Ohio. 
Justice Clark's opportunity of the year was the movie censorship case.225 
To this reader at least, the resulting opinion is in a sense anticlimactic. 
Students of the subject have been awaiting the overruling of the anach-
ronistic Mutual Film case226 for so long that somehow the great day should 
be introduced with a legal equivalent of the rolling of drums; one hoped 
for an opinion in the grand style. Justice Clark treats the case as just an-
other job in a work-a-day world. One must go to the co~currence to grati-
fy a natural curiosity as to what the movie is about and how, in its whole 
context, the problem arose; and where one might hope for serious analysis 
of the place of movies in relation to speech and press, the result is very 
nearly assumed. This may well be the best possible strategy for innova-
tion; all that is meant to be suggested is that for all one's gratitude for 
what is served, the taste is a little flat. 
The Justice's position in the steel seizure case227 is clear enough. The 
enigma is why be took it. He was the only Justice to see any, much less 
crucial, relevance in the seizure provision of the Selective Service Act of 
· 1948, and with so many better reasons for going in either direction, it is 
hard to understand why he chose this one.228 Of his less colorful opinions, 
perhaps the best is Brannan v. Stark,229 on payments to milk co-operatives 
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The subject is difficult, the opin-
us 343 U.S. 90 (1952); the others are Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952), and 
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). 
12
• Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
:m Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
2!5 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
127Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). 
22s See note 38 supra. 
229 342 u.s. 451 (1952). 
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ion well done and persuasive. Like the steel case, though of course in 
lesser degree, it found him deciding against the administration. His lesser 
opinions were all well done. 
As has been noted, Justice Minton this year became the first Justice, in 
the course of the six years this series of articles has been presented, to de-
cide against the claimed civil liberty in every divided civil rights case in 
which he participated. His position in these cases has the multiple merits 
of brevity, clarity and candor. The Feinberg Law case,230 discussed above 
at length, is a good example. There is here no mealy-mouthed set of in-
significant qualifications, no pretense of doing less than is being done. 
Guilt by association? Justice Minton sees nothing wrong with showing 
personal disqualification by checking the views of associates, and he says 
so. Free speech for teachers? Justice Minton thinks that if they want free 
speech so badly, they should get other jobs; and again he says so. 
Some of the Justice's positions in this area are particularly hard to ac-
cept. He apparently believes that there can be no denial of due process in 
giving a sentence no matter how captious a judge is, so long as he does 
not exceed the statutory maximum;231 Justice Minton makes no reserva-
tion at all for a duty to deliberate fairly before sentence is imposed. In one 
right to counsel case,232 the Court decided that the defendant was not 
capable of defending himself adequately without a lawyer. Many years 
earlier the defendant had been institutionalized as an imbecile. Justice 
Minton, becoming so interested in showing that the defendant was not 
really, in the technical sense, an imbecile, makes no allowance for the fact 
that the man, at best, was not very bright. 
Outside of the emotion-laden area of civil liberty, where if Justice Min-
ton may be too extreme, his critics may be too harsh, there was a series of 
excellent Minton opinions. His dissent in the most important Labor Board 
case233 of the year is very good, and a complex alien enemy property prob-
lem is analyzed with great skill in Uebersee Finanz-Korp. A.G. v. 
McGratlt234 His lone dissent in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck/35 on the taxability 
of vessels in inland waters in the state of their incorporation is not merely 
more persuasive, but also better as a presentation of its view, than the 
majority opinion. 
230 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
231 Keenan v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1952). 
2a2 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951). 
233 NLRB v. American Nat' I Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
214 343 u.s. 205 (1952). 235 342 u.s. 382 (1952). 
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CONCLUSION 
The 1951 Term was the last full judicial year in the Presidential terms 
of Harry Truman. The Truman Court will thus outlast, and possibly long 
outlast, the tenure of the President who appointed four of the Justices. 
It is of course fitting and proper in a democracy that a judiciary, even 
one exercising the power of judicial review, should take the complexion 
of changing popular demands and changing administrations. No theorist 
of democracy supposes that the judiciary should have become static with 
John Marshall. The judicial function as the gyroscope of American policy 
is to adjust the needs of society, but to adjust slowly. 
The transition from the New Deal Court to the Fair Deal Court has 
been a great change. In matters of economic policy, the machine runs in 
the same general direction as did the Roosevelt Court, but such vigor, 
militancy and spirit of innovation as the earlier Court had is gone. The 
new static Sherman Act is the best example. In matters of civil rights, the 
general direction has been reversed. The principal contribution of this 
Court, whether for good or for evil, has been the introduction of a new era 
of legislative and executive supremacy over individual liberty. 
Justice Frankfurter, in the steel case, refers felicitously to the Presi-
dent as "a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of 
the ~ississippi Valley." As the time for the change in the appointing 
power comes, one wonders whether this President, if he took the time 
really to know what he had created, would want to do it again. 
